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Abstract
We first see that the inertia of Newtonian mechanics is absolute and troublesome.
General relativity can be viewed as Einstein’s attempt to remedy, by making iner-
tia relative, to matter—perhaps imperfectly though, as at least a couple of freedom
degrees separate inertia from matter in his theory. We consider ways the relationist
(for whom it is of course unwelcome) can try to overcome such undetermination,
dismissing it as physically meaningless, especially by insisting on the right trans-
formation properties.
1 Introduction
The indifference of mechanical phenomena and the classical laws governing them to
absolute position, to translation has long been known. This ‘relativity’ extends to the
first derivative, velocity, but not to the second, acceleration, which—together with its
opposite,1 inertia—has a troubling absoluteness, dealt with in §2.1. General relativ-
ity can be seen as Einstein’s attempt to overcome that absoluteness (§2.2), by making
inertia relative, to matter. But one can wonder about the extent and nature of the ‘rela-
tivisation.’
Following Einstein we (§3.1) take matter to be represented by the energy-momen-
tum tensor2 T ab —rather than byU
µ
ν = T
µ
ν +t
µ
ν , which includes the gravitational energy-
momentum tµν whose transformation properties make it too subjective and insubstantial
to count. The role of distant matter is looked at in §3.2. Inertia can be identified with
affine or projective structure, as we see in §3.3. In §3.5 matter appears to underdeter-
mine inertia by ten degrees of freedom, eight of which are (§3.6) made to ‘disappear
1For motion is inertial when acceleration vanishes. Inertial motion can also be understood, in more
Aristotelian terms, as “natural” rather than “violent” (accelerated) motion. Weyl (2000, p. 138) has a cor-
responding dualism between inertia and force: “gravity, in the dualism between inertia and force, belongs
to inertia, not to force. In the phenomena of gravitation therefore the inertial- or, as I prefer to say, the
guidance-field [ . . . ].” Cf. Weyl (1924, p. 198): “Dualism between guidance and force.” (The translations
from German and from French are ours.)
2Indices from the beginning of the Roman alphabet are abstract indices specifying valence, contraction
(the once-contravariant and twice-covariant trilinear mapping Aabc = B
a
bdcC
d : V∗ × V × V → R, for
instance, turns one covector and two vectors into a number) etc., whereas Greek letters are used for space-
time coordinate indices running from 0 to 3, and i, j and l for ‘spatial’ coordinate indices from 1 to 3.
Sometimes we write V for a four-vector V a, α for a one-form αa, g for the metric gab, and 〈α, V 〉 for
the scalar product αaV a = 〈αa, V a〉. The abstract index of the covector dxµ = dxµa , whose valence is
obvious, will usually be omitted.
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into the coordinates.’ We take such coordinate transformations to be physically mean-
ingless and concentrate on the significance of the remaining quantities instead, which
represent the polarisation of gravitational waves.
The physics of gravitational waves seems vulnerable to (admittedly radical) coor-
dinate substitutions, as we see in §3.7: their generation, energy, perhaps even their
detection can be ‘transformed away’ if the full range of substitutions, on which general
relativity was built, is available. Belief in the production, indeed in the very existence
of gravitational radiation is bound up with the binary star PSR 1913 +16, which is
considered in §3.14 and supposed to lose kinetic energy as it spirals inwards; if energy
is conserved, the energy lost in one form must be converted, into a perturbation of the
surrounding space-time one presumes. But the conservation law is flawed (§3.9), in-
volving, in its integral form, a distant comparison of directions that cannot be both gen-
erally covariant and unambiguously integrable. Even the ‘spiral’ behaviour itself, the
loss of kinetic energy, and perhaps the oscillation on which detection (§3.15) is based
can be transformed away; as can the energy of the gravitational field, which is custom-
arily assigned using the pseudotensor tµν : while an observer in free fall sees nothing
at all, an acceleration would produce energy out of nowhere, out of a mere transfor-
mation to another ‘point of view’ or rather state of motion. To take advantage of this
fragility of gravitational waves, the relationist wanting motion (inertia in particular) to
be ‘entirely relative’ to matter will be mathematically intransigent and attribute phys-
ical significance only to notions with the right transformation behaviour—and none
to those that can be transformed away—thus allowing him to dispute the reality of the
unwelcome freedoms separating matter and inertia, which he can dismiss as mere opin-
ion, as meaningless decoration. If general covariance has to hold, matter would seem
to determine inertia rather strongly . . .
In the early years of general relativity, Hilbert, Levi-Civita, Schro¨dinger and others
attributed physical meaning only to objects, like tensors, with the right transformation
behaviour. Einstein was at first less severe, extending reality to notions with a more
radical dependence on the observer’s state of motion. With a mathematical argument
(§3.10) giving a favourable representation of the integral conservation law’s transfor-
mation properties he persuaded the community to share his tolerance; but would soon,
having meanwhile read a manuscript by Cassirer (§3.12), change his mind (§3.11) and
also require general covariance for physical significance. The relationist can wonder
about an argument, and of a widespread indulgence it helped produce, whose proponent
and advocate soon adopted the intransigence of his previous opponents.
But rather than as a defence of relationism—for we have no axe to grind—this
should be viewed as an exploration of the logical landscape, of certain logical gaps
or possibilities the relationist can exploit, especially one that (perhaps unwisely) takes
fundamental principles like general covariance more seriously than the lenient prag-
matics of day-to-day practice, computation, prediction and success.
The various ways we help or hinder the relationist may sometimes seem arbitrary;
to some extent they are arbitrary, or rather influenced by our tastes and interests; but
they also take account of the literature and the very full treatments it contains, to which
in many cases we have nothing to add.3
3For instance we hesitate to help the relationist with the distant masses (which of course constrain inertia)
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2 Absolute inertia
2.1 Newtonian mechanics
Newton distinguished between an “absolute” space he also called “true and mathemat-
ical,” and the “relative, apparent and vulgar” space in which distances and velocities
are physically but imperfectly measured down here (rather than exactly divined by the
Divinity). Absolute position and motion were not referred to anything. Leibniz iden-
tified unnecessary determinations, excess structure4 in Newton’s ‘absolute’ kinematics
with celebrated arguments resting on the principium identitatis indiscernibilium: as a
translation of everything, or an exchange of east and west, produces no observable ef-
fect, the situations before and after must be the same, for no difference is discerned. But
there were superfluities with respect to Newton’s own dynamics too,5 founded as it was
on the proportionality of force and acceleration. With his gran navilio, Galileo (1632,
Second day) had already noted the indifference of various effetti to inertial transforma-
tions; the invariance6 of Newton’s laws would more concisely express the indifference
of all the effetti they governed.7
Modern notation, however anachronistic, can help sharpen interpretation. The
derivatives x˙ = dx/dt and x¨ = dx˙/dt are quotients of differences; already the po-
sition difference
∆x = x(t+ ε)− x(t)
= x(t+ ε) + u− [x(t) + u]
is indifferent to the addition of a constant u (which is the same for x both at t and at
t+ ε). The velocity
x˙ = lim
ε→0
∆x
ε
is therefore unaffected by the three-parameter group S of translations x 7→ x+u acting
on the three-dimensional space E. The difference
∆x˙ = x˙(t+ ε)− x˙(t)
= x˙(t+ ε) + v − [x˙(t) + v]
of velocities is likewise indifferent to the addition of a constant velocity v (which is the
same for x˙ both at t and at t+ ε). The acceleration
x¨ = lim
ε→0
∆x˙
ε
is therefore invariant under the six-parameter group S × V which includes, alongside
the translations, the group V of the inertial transformations x 7→ x + vt, x˙ 7→ x˙ + v
acting on the space-time E = E × R.
whose influence in the initial-value formulation has been so abundantly considered by Wheeler and others.
4For a recent treatment see Ryckman (2003, pp. 76-80).
5Cf. Dieks (2006, p. 178).
6Newton (1833), Corollarium V (to the laws)
7On this distinction and its significance in relativity see Dieks (2006), where the effetti are called “factual
states of affairs.”
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The difference
∆x = x(t+ ε)− x(t) = xa(t+ a+ ε)− xa(t+ a) = ∆xa
is also invariant under the group T of time translations. The translation t 7→ t+ a ∈ R
can be seen as a relabelling of instants which makes x, or rather xa, assign to t + a
the value x assigned to t: xa(t + a) = x(t). The difference ∆x˙ = ∆x˙a has the same
invariance—as do the quotients ∆x/ε, ∆x˙/ε, and the limits x˙, x¨.
Newton’s second law8 is ‘covariant’ with respect to the group R = SO(S) of rota-
tions R : E → E, which turn the “straight line along which the force is applied” with
the “change of motion,” in the sense that the two rotations F 7→ RF, x¨ 7→ Rx¨, taken
together, maintain the proportionality of force and acceleration expressed by the law:
[F ∼ x¨]⇔ [RF ∼ Rx¨]. We can say the second law is indifferent9 to the action of the
ten-parameter Galilei group10 G = (S × V)o (T ×R) with composition
(u,v, a, R)o (u′,v′, a′, R′) = (u+Ru′ + a′v,v +Rv′, a+ a′, RR′),
o being the semidirect product. So the absolute features of Newtonian mechanics—
acceleration, force, inertia, the laws—emerge as invariants of the Galilei group, whose
transformations change the relative ones: position, velocity and so forth. A larger
group admitting acceleration would undermine the laws, requiring generalisation with
other forces.
Cartan (1923)11 undertook such a generalisation, with a larger group, new laws and
other forces. The general covariance of his Newtonian formalism (with a flat connec-
tion) may seem to make inertia and acceleration relative, but in fact the meaningful
acceleration in his theory is not d2xi/dt2, which can be called relative12 (to the coor-
dinates), but the absolute
(1) Ai =
d2xi
dt2
+
3∑
j,l=1
Γ ijl
dxj
dt
dxl
dt
(i = 1, 2, 3 and the time t is absolute). Relative acceleration comes and goes as co-
ordinates change, whereas absolute acceleration is generally covariant and transforms
as a tensor: if it vanishes in one system it always will. The two accelerations co-
incide with respect to inertial coordinates, which make the connection components13
8“Mutationem motus proportionalem esse vi motrici impressæ, et fieri secundum lineam rectam qua vis
illa imprimitur.”
9For Newton’s forces are superpositions of fundamental forces F = f(|x2 − x1|, |x˙2 − x˙1|, |x¨2 −
x¨1|, . . . ), covariant under G, exchanged by pairs of points.
10See Le´vy-Leblond (1971, pp. 224-9).
11See also Friedman (1983, §III), Penrose (2005, §17.5).
12In Baker (2005) there appears to be a confusion of the two accelerations as they arise—in much the
same way—in general relativity. The acceleration d2xµ/dτ2 6= 0 Baker sees as evidence of the causal
powers possessed by an ostensibly empty space-time with Λ 6= 0 is merely relative; even with Λ 6= 0 free
bodies describe geodesics, which are wordlines whose absolute acceleration vanishes. The sensitivity of
projective or affine structure to the cosmological constant Λ would seem to be more meaningful, and can
serve to indicate similar causal powers.
13The abstract index representing the valence of the ‘partial derivation’ vector ∂i = ∂ai = ∂/∂x
i tangent
to the ith coordinate line will be omitted.
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Γ ijl = 〈dxi,∇∂j∂l〉 vanish. The absolute acceleration of inertial motion vanishes how-
ever it is represented—the connection being there to cancel the acceleration of non-
inertial coordinates.
So far, then, we have two formal criteria of inertial motion:
• x¨ = 0 in Newton’s theory
• Ai = 0 in Cartan’s.
But Newton’s criterion doesn’t really get us anywhere, as the vanishing acceleration
has to be referred to an inertial frame in the first place; to Cartan’s we are about to
return.
Einstein (1916, p. 770; 1988, p. 40; 1990, p. 28) and others have appealed to the
simplicity of laws to tell inertia apart from acceleration: inertial systems admit the
simplest laws. Condition x¨ = 0, for instance, is simpler than y¨ + a = 0, with a
term a to compensate the acceleration of system y. But we have just seen that Car-
tan’s theory takes account of possibile acceleration ab initio, thus preempting subse-
quent complication—for accelerated coordinates do not appear to affect the syntactical
form14 of (1), which is complicated to begin with by the connection term. One could
argue that the law simplifies when that term disappears, when the coefficients Γ ijl all
vanish; but then we’re back to the Newtonian condition x¨ = 0. And just as that condi-
tion requires an inertial system in the first place, Cartan’s condition Ai = 0 requires a
connection, which is pretty much equivalent: it can be seen as a convention stipulating
how the three-dimensional simultaneity surfaces are ‘stitched’15 together by a congru-
ence of (mathematically) arbitrary curves defined as geodesics. The connection would
then be determined, a posteriori as it were, by the requirement that its coefficients
vanish for those inertial curves. Once one congruence is chosen the connection, thus
determined, provides all other congruences that are inertial with respect to the first. So
the initial geodesics, by stitching together the simultaneity spaces, first provide a no-
tion of rest and velocity, then a connection, representing inertia and acceleration. The
Newtonian condition x¨ = 0 presupposes the very class of inertial systems given by
the congruence and connection in Cartan’s theory. So we seem to be going around in
circles: motion is inertial if it is inertial with respect to inertial motion.
We should not be too surprised that purely formal criteria are of little use on their
own for the identification of something as physical as inertia. But are more physical,
empirical criteria not available? Suppose we view Newton’s first law, his ‘principle
of inertia,’ as a special case of the second law F = mx¨ with vanishing force (and
hence acceleration). So far we have been concentrating on the more mathematical
right-hand side, on vanishing acceleration; but there is also the more physical left-hand
side F = 0: can inertial systems not be characterised16 as free and far from everything
else? Even if certain bodies may be isolated enough to be almost entirely uninfluenced
by others, the matter remains problematic. For one thing we have no direct access
to such roughly free bodies, everything around us gets pulled and accelerated. And
14Cf. Dieks (2006, p. 186).
15See Earman (1989, §§1,2), for instance.
16Einstein (1916, p. 772; 1988, p. 40; 1990, p. 59)
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the absence of gravitational force is best assessed with respect to an inertial system,17
which is what we were after in the first place.
Just as the absence of force has been appealed to for the identification of inertia,
its presence can be noted in an attempt to characterise acceleration; various passages18
in the scholium on absolute space and time show that Newton, for instance, proposed
to tell apart inertia and acceleration through causes, effects, forces.19 In the two ex-
periments described at the end of the scholium, involving the bucket and the rotating
globes, there is an interplay of local causes and effects: the rotation of the water causes
it to rise on the outside; the forces applied to opposite sides of the globes cause the
tension in the string joining them to vary. But this doesn’t get us very far either; our
problem remains, as we see using the distinction drawn above between absolute ac-
celeration Ai and relative acceleration d2xi/dt2, which surprisingly corresponds to a
distinction Newton himself is groping for in the following passage from the scholium:
The causes by which true and relative motions are distinguished, one from
the other, are the forces impressed upon bodies to generate motion. True
motion is neither generated nor altered, but by some force impressed upon
the body moved; but relative motion may be generated or altered without
any force impressed upon the body. For it is sufficient only to impress
some force on other bodies with which the former is compared, that by
their giving way, that relation may be changed, in which the relative rest
or motion of this other body did consist. Again, true motion suffers al-
ways some change from any force impressed upon the moving body; but
relative motion does not necessarily undergo any change by such forces.
For if the same forces are likewise impressed on those other bodies, with
which the comparison is made, that the relative position may be preserved,
then that condition will be preserved in which the relative motion consists.
And therefore any relative motion may be changed when the true motion
remains unaltered, and the relative may be preserved when the true suffers
some change. Thus, true motion by no means consists in such relations.20
17An anonymous referee has pointed out that inertial systems can be large and rigid in flat space-times,
but not with curvature; where present, tidal effects prevent inertial motion from being rigid, and even rule
out large inertial frames; but see §3.4.
18“Distinguuntur autem quies et motus absoluti et relativi ab invicem per proprietates suas et causas et
effectus”; “Causæ, quibus motus veri et relativi distinguuntur ab invicem, sunt vires in corpora impressæ
ad motum generandum”; “Effectus, quibus motus absoluti et relativi distinguuntur ab invicem, sunt vires
recedendi ab axe motus circularis”; “Motus autem veros ex eorum causis, effectibus, et apparentibus differ-
entiis colligere, et contra ex motibus seu veris seu apparentibus eorum causas et effectus, docebitur fusius in
sequentibus.”
19Cf. Rynasiewicz (1995).
20“Causæ, quibus motus veri et relativi distinguuntur ab invicem, sunt vires in corpora impressæ ad mo-
tum generandum. Motus verus nec generatur nec mutatur nisi per vires in ipsum corpus motum impressas:
at motus relativus generari et mutari potest absq; viribus impressis in hoc corpus. Sufficit enim ut impri-
mantur in alia solum corpora ad quæ fit relatio, ut ijs cedentibus mutetur relatio illa in qua hujus quies vel
motus relativus consistit. Rursus motus verus a viribus in corpus motum impressis semper mutatur, at motus
relativus ab his viribus non mutatur necessario. Nam si eædem vires in alia etiam corpora, ad quæ fit relatio,
sic imprimantur ut situs relativus conservetur, conservabitur relatio in qua motus relativus consistit. Mutari
igitur potest motus omnis relativus ubi verus conservatur, et conservari ubi verus mutatur; et propterea motus
verus in ejusmodi relationibus minime consistit.”
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The absolute motus of a body β requires a force on β, but to produce relative motus
the force can act on the reference body γ instead; and relative motus can even be can-
celled if force is applied to both β and γ. The translators, Motte and Cajori, render
motus as “motion” throughout, but the passage only makes sense (today) if we use
acceleration, for most occurrences at any rate: Newton first speaks explicitly of the
generation or alteration of motion, to establish that ‘acceleration’ is at issue; having
settled that he abbreviates and just writes motus—while continuing to mean acceler-
ation. And he distinguishes between a true acceleration and a relative acceleration
which can be consistently interpreted, however anachronistically, as Ai and d2xi/dt2.
Of course Newton knows neither about connections nor affine structure, nor even ma-
trices; but he is clearly groping for something neither he nor we can really pin down
using the mathematical resources then available. It may not be pointless to think of a
‘Cauchy convergence’ of sorts towards something which at the time is unidentified and
alien, and only much later gets discovered and identified as the goal towards which the
intentions, the gropings were tending.
When Newton states, in the second law, that the mutationem motus is proportional
to force, he could mean either the true acceleration or the relative acceleration; indeed it
is in the spirit of the passage just quoted to distinguish correspondingly—pursuing our
anachronism—between a true force F i = mAi and a relative force f i = md2xi/dt2.
This last equation represents one condition for two unknowns, of which one can be
fixed or measured to yield the other. But the relative force f i is the wrong one. The
‘default values’ for both force and acceleration, the ones Newton is really interested
in, the ones he means when he doesn’t specify, the ones that work in his laws, are the
‘true’ ones: true force and true acceleration. And even if F i = mAi also looks like one
condition for two unknowns, the true acceleration Ai in fact conceals two unknowns,
the relative acceleration d2xi/dt2 and the difference Ai − d2xi/dt2 representing the
absolute acceleration of the coordinate system.21 Nothing doing then, we’re still going
around in circles: the inertia of Newtonian mechanics remains absolute, and cannot
even be ‘made relative’ to force.
But what’s wrong with absolute inertia? In fact it can also be seen as ‘relative,’ but
to something—mathematical structure or the sensorium Dei or absolute space—that
isn’t really there, that’s too tenuous, invisible, mathematical, ætherial, unmeasurable
or theological to count as a cause, as a physically effective circumstance, for most em-
piricists at any rate.22 The three unknowns of F i = mAi are a problem because in
Newtonian mechanics affine structure, which determines Ai − d2xi/dt2, is unobserv-
able. By relating it to matter Einstein would give inertia a solid, tangible, empirically
satisfactory foundation.
2.2 Einstein
General relativity can be seen as a response to various things. It suits our purposes to
view it as a reaction to two ‘absolute’ features of Newtonian mechanics, of Newtonian
21All sorts of questions can be raised about the direct measurability of the true force.
22Cf. Einstein (1916, pp. 771-2; 1917b, p. 49; 1990, p. 57), Cassirer (1921, pp. 31, 38, 39), Rovelli (2007,
§2.2.2).
7
inertia, to which Einstein objected: i. an observable effect arising out of an unob-
servable cause; and ii. action without passion. In §3 we will wonder how complete a
response it would prove.
i. We have just seen that Newton proposed to find absolute acceleration through its
causes and effects. Einstein also speaks of cause and effect—and practically seems to
be addressing Newton and his efforts to sort out absolute and relative motus—in his ex-
position of the thought experiment at the beginning of “Die Grundlage der allgemeinen
Relativita¨tstheorie” (1916, p. 771). There he brings together elements of Newton’s two
experiments—rotating fluid, two rotating bodies: Two fluid bodies of the same size and
kind, S1 and S2, spin with respect to one another around the axis joining them while
they float freely in space, far from everything else and at a considerable, unchanging
distance from each other. Whereas S1 is a sphere S2 is ellipsoidal. Einstein’s analy-
sis of the difference betrays positivist zeal and impatience with metaphysics. Newton,
who could be metaphysically indulgent to a point of mysticism, might—untroubled by
the absence of a manifest local cause—have been happy to view the deformation of
S2 as the effect of an absolute rotation it would thus serve to reveal. Einstein’s epis-
temological severity makes him more demanding; he wants the observable cause23 of
the differing shapes; seeing no local cause, within the system, he feels obliged to look
elsewhere and finds an external one in distant masses which rotate with respect to S2.
ii. Einstein (1990) also objects to “the postulation,” in Newtonian mechanics, “of a
thing (the space-time continuum) which acts without being acted upon.”24 Newtonian
space-time structure—inertial structure in particular—has a lopsided, unreciprocated
relationship with matter, which despite being guided by it does nothing in return.
General relativity responds to absolute inertia by relating inertia to matter, which
has a more obvious physical presence than mathematical background structure or the
sensorium Dei. In “Prinzipielles zur allgemeinen Relativita¨tstheorie” (1918a) Einstein
goes so far as to claim that inertia25 in his theory is entirely determined26 by matter,
which he uses Tab to represent:
Since mass and energy are the same according to special relativity, and
energy is formally described by the symmetric tensor (Tµν), the G-field is
determined by the energy tensor of matter.27
23Einstein (1916, p. 771); cf. footnote 22 above. Einstein wants visible effects to have visible causes; cf.
Poincare´ (1908, pp. 64-94), who sees “chance” when “large” effects have “small” causes—which can even
be too small to be observable; and Russell (1961, p. 162): “a very small force might produce a very large
effect. [ . . . ] An act of volition may lead one atom to this choice rather than that, which may upset some very
delicate balance and so produce a large-scale result, such as saying one thing rather than another.”
24P. 58: “Erstens na¨mlich widerstrebt es dem wissenschaftlichen Verstande, ein Ding zu setzen (na¨mlich
das zeitra¨umliche Kontinuum), das zwar wirkt, auf welches aber nicht gewirkt werden kann.” Cf. Weyl (1931,
p. 51): “Space accordingly acts on [things], the way one necessarily conceives the behaviour of an absolute
God on the world: the world subject to his action, he spared however of any reaction.”
25In fact he speaks of the “G-field” (1918a, p. 241), “the state of space described by the fundamental
tensor,” by which inertia is represented: “Inertia and weight are essentially the same. From this, and from
the results of the special theory of relativity, it follows necessarily that the symmetrical ‘fundamental tensor’
(gµν ) determines the metrical properties of space, the inertial behaviour of bodies in it, as well as gravita-
tional effects.”
26Ibid. p. 241: “Mach’s principle: The G-field is completely determined by the masses of bodies.” See
Hoefer (1995) on “Einstein’s formulations of Mach’s principle.”
27Ibid. 241-2: “Da Masse und Energie nach den Ergebnissen der speziellen Relativita¨tstheorie das Gleiche
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He explains in a footnote (p. 241) that this Machsches Prinzip is a generalisation of
Mach’s requirement (1988, §2.6) that inertia be derivable from interactions between
bodies.28
So we seem to be wondering about what Einstein calls Mach’s principle, which
provides a convenient label, and is something along the lines of matter determines
inertia. We have seen what a nuisance absolute inertia can be; to remedy Einstein
made it relative, to matter; we accordingly consider the extent and character of his
‘relativisation,’ of the determination of inertia by matter.
3 The relativity of inertia
3.1 Matter
To begin with, what is matter? Einstein (1918a), we have seen, used T ab to characterise
it, but maybe one should be more permissive and countenance less substantial stuff as
well. Einstein proposed
(2) tµν =
1
2
δµν g
στΓλσρΓ
ρ
τλ − gστΓµσρΓ ρτν
for the representation of gravitational mass-energy; matter without mass, or mass away
from matter, are hard to imagine; so perhaps we can speak of gravitational matter-mass-
energy.29 How about Uµν = T
µ
ν +t
µ
ν then, rather than just T
a
b ? Several drawbacks come
to mind. The right-hand side30 of (2) shows how such ‘matter’ would be related to the
notoriously untensorial connection components. In free fall, when they vanish, the
pseudotensor tµν does too,
31 which means that gravitational matter-mass-energy would
be a matter of opinion,32 its presence depending on the state of motion of the observer.
The distribution of matter-mass-energy in apparently empty space-time would accord-
ingly depend on the choice of coordinates. To be extremely liberal one could even fill
the whole universe, however empty or flat, on grounds that matter-mass-energy is po-
tentially present everywhere, as an appropriate acceleration could produce it anywhere.
A superabundance of matter would help constrain inertia and hence make ‘Mach’s
principle’—indeed any relationist claim or principle—easier to satisfy, perhaps to a
point of vacuity. The relationist would also be brought uncomfortably close to his ‘ab-
solutist’ opponent, who believes there is more to inertia than one may think, that it
sind, und die Energie formal durch den symmetrische Energietensor (Tµν ) beschrieben wird, so besagt dies,
daß das G-Feld durch den Energietensor der Materie bedingt und bestimmt sei.”
28Barbour & Pfister (1995) is full of excellent accounts; see also Earman (1989, pp. 105-8), Mamone
Capria (2005) and Rovelli (2007, §2.4.1).
29Cf. Russell (1927, p. 82): “We do not regard energy as a “thing,” because it is not connected with the
qualitative continuity of common-sense objects: it may appear as light or heat or sound or what not. But now
that energy and mass have turned out to be identical, our refusal to regard energy as a “thing” should incline
us to the view that what possesses mass need not be a “thing.””
30Its convenient form is assumed with respect to coordinates satisfying 1 =
√−g, where g is the deter-
minant of the metric.
31Issues related to the domain of Wegtransformierbarkeit are considered in §3.4. Wegtransformierbarkeit
or ‘away-transformability’ is a useful notion for which there seems to be no English word.
32Cf. Earman & Norton (1987, p. 519).
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goes beyond and somehow transcends determination by matter. Indeed if we spread
matter too liberally we hardly leave the relationist and absolutist much room to differ.
Rynasiewicz (1996) has already dismissed their debate as “outmoded”; the surest way
to hasten its complete (and regrettable) demise is to impose agreement, by a question-
able appeal to a dubious object which can cover the universe with slippery coordinate-
dependent matter that disappears in free fall and reappears under acceleration.33 We
began with Newton, Leibniz and Galileo, have been guided by a continuity connecting
their preoccupations with Einstein’s, and accordingly adopt a notion of matter that dif-
fers as little as possible (within general relativity) from theirs: hence T ab , rather than
the ill-behaved Uµν = T
µ
ν + t
µ
ν .
3.2 Distant matter
This paper is much more about general relativity than about Mach himself; it is cer-
tainly not about Mach’s own formulations of his principles. The vagueness and ambi-
guities of Mach (1988, §2.6) have given rise to an abundance of ‘Mach’s principles,’
many of which are represented in Barbour & Pfister (1995). Mach and Einstein (1916,
p. 772) both speak of “distant” matter, which indeed figures in several versions of
‘Mach’s principle’: one can say it is part of the ‘Machian tradition,’ conspicuously
associated with Einstein, Wheeler, Barbour and others. But distant matter can affect
inertia in two very different ways: i. the ‘deceptive continuity’ or ‘average character’
of ρ; and ii. ‘field-theoretical holism.’
i. Einstein’s equation Gab(x) = Tab(x) seems to express a circumscribed (direct)
relationship between inertia and matter at (or around) point x. The matter-energy-
momentum tensor
T ab(x) = ρ(x)V aV b,
for instance, describing a dust with density ρ and four-velocity V a, would (directly)
constrain inertia at x, not at other points far away. But much as in electromagnetism,
the ‘continuity’ of ρ is deceptive. Once the scale is large enough to give a semblance
of continuity to the density ρ, almost all the celestial bodies contributing to the deter-
mination of ρ(x) will be very far, on any familiar scale, from x. Einstein (1917a) sees
ρ as an average, and speaks of ‘spreading’:
The metrical structure of this continuum must therefore, as the distribution
of matter is not uniform, necessarily be most complicated. But if we are
only interested in the structure in the large, we ought to represent matter
as evenly spread over enormous spaces, so that its density of distribution
will be a function that varies very slowly.34
Needless to say, all the matter involved in the determination of ρ(x) will be very close
to x on the largest scales; but matter far from x even on those scales has a role too, a
33This is no peculiarity of general relativity, as an anonymous referee has pointed out: even in older
theories the local energy density can disappear and reappear under coordinate changes.
34P. 135: “Die metrische Struktur dieses Kontinuums muß daher wegen der Ungleichma¨ßigkeit der
Verteilung der Materie notwendig eine a¨ußerst verwickelte sein. Wenn es uns aber nur auf die Struktur im
großen ankommt, du¨rfen wir uns die Materie als u¨ber ungeheure Ra¨ume gleichma¨ßig ausgebreitet vorstellen,
so daß deren Verteilungsdichte eine ungeheuer langsam vera¨nderliche Funktion wird.”
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field-theoretical role, as we shall now see.
ii. Riemann (1854) considered the possibility of a discrete manifold D, with de-
numerable elements D1, D2, . . . . Of course the value ϕr = ϕ(Dr) of a (scalar) field
ϕ at Dr will be completely unconstrained by the values ϕs at other points Ds if no
restrictions are imposed. On its own the ‘boundary condition’ ϕs → 0 as s→∞—or
even the stronger condition ϕs vanishes for s > 1—will not constrain ϕ1 at all. But
the further requirement that, say,
|ϕr − ϕs| < 1
2
min{|ϕr|, |ϕs|}
for adjacent points (i.e. |r − s| = 1) gives, by heavily constraining either value once
the other is fixed, the crudest idea of how boundary conditions act.
Of course the manifolds involved in general relativity are continuous, with smooth
fields on them, which leads to subtler, less trivial constraint: such fields can undulate,
propagate perturbations, drag and so forth; the constrained relationship between neigh-
bouring values can ripple across the universe at the speed of light. The value R(x)
of a field R at point x can be indirectly constrained through restrictions imposed by
another field T on the values R(x′) at points x′ far away; or directly, by the physi-
cist, who may require for instance that R itself vanish somewhere—here one speaks of
‘boundary conditions.’ If the universe foliates into spatially non-compact simultaneity
surfaces, such boundary conditions have to be imposed, typically asymptotic flatness.
But this, wrote Einstein (1917a), is at odds with the relativity of inertia: “inertia would
be influenced but not determined by matter”35—since the full determination requires
the ‘additional,’ physically ‘extraneous’ stipulation of boundary conditions. So he did
away with boundary conditions by doing away with the boundary: he proposed a uni-
verse foliating into spatially compact simultaneity surfaces (without boundary), which
lend themselves to ‘global’ Machian interpretations by favouring the determination of
inertia by matter.36
Even if the determination is partly field-theoretical, holistic, global, non-local,37 we
will concentrate on the ‘punctual’ determination, on the arithmetic and comparison of
freedom degrees at a point. Words like “determination,” “over/underdetermination” or
“freedom” are often referred to a single point—by Einstein and others—even in field-
theoretical contexts (where more holistic influences are also at work), and seem neither
illegitimate, meaningless nor inappropriate when applied so locally.38
It is worth mentioning that Einstein’s own position on the matter of punctual rather
than field-theoretical, non-local determination is confusing. In “Kosmologische Betra-
35P. 135: “Somit wu¨rde die Tra¨gheit durch die (im Endlichen vorhandene) Materie zwar beeinflußt aber
nicht bedingt.”
36Both kinds of foliation have received ample attention in the literature; see Wheeler (1959), Choquet-
Bruhat (1962), O´ Murchadha & York (1974), Isenberg & Wheeler (1979), Choquet-Bruhat & York (1980),
Isenberg (1981), York (1982), Ciufolini & Wheeler (1995, §5), Lusanna & Pauri (2006a,b,c), Lusanna
(2007), Lusanna & Alba (2007).
37Lusanna & Pauri (2006a, pp. 719-20 for instance) consider such non-locality in the Hamiltonian formu-
lation.
38Specification of circumstances at a point is not enough, as an anonymous referee has pointed out, for
prediction in a field theory, where much more (Cauchy data on a Cauchy surface) would have to be indicated.
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chtungen zur allgemeinen Relativita¨tstheorie” (1917a), which is all about field-theo-
retical holism, he writes:
According to general relativity, the metrical character (curvature) of the
four-dimensional space-time continuum is determined at every point by
the matter that’s there, together with its state.39
And he often counts degrees freedom at a point, saying that one object there over- or
under-determines another.
3.3 Inertia
Inertial motion is free and not forced by alien influences to deviate from its natural
course. The characterisation is general, its terms take on specific meaning in particu-
lar theories: in general relativity, inertial motion is subject only to gravity and not to
electromagnetic or other forces; we accordingly identify inertia with the structures that
guide the free fall of small40 bodies (perhaps the hands of clocks too) by determining
the (possibly parametrised) geodesics they describe.41
We have seen that Einstein identifies inertia with the metric g, which in general
relativity—where ∇g vanishes (along with torsion)—corresponds to the affine struc-
ture given by the Levi-Civita connection ∇ = Π0, with twenty degrees of freedom.
It gives the parametrised geodesics σ0 : (a0, b0) → M ; s0 7→ σ0(s0) through
∇σ˙0 σ˙0 = 0, and represents the ‘inertia’ of the parameter, hence of the hands of clocks,
along with that of matter. (M is the differential manifold representing the universe.)
But time and clocks may be less the point here than plain free fall. Weyl42 identified
inertia with the weaker projective structure Π, which gives the ‘generalised geodesics’43
σ : (a, b) → M ; s 7→ σ(s), through ∇σ˙σ˙ = λσ˙. Projective structure just represents
free fall, in other words the inertia of bodies alone, not of bodies and the hands of ac-
companying clocks. One can say it is purely ‘material,’ rather than ‘materio-temporal.’
In the class Π = {Πα : α ∈ Λ1(M )} of connections projectively equivalent
to ∇, a particular connection Πα is singled out by a one-form α, which fixes the
parametrisations s of all the generalised geodesics σ. So projective structure has
twenty-four degrees of freedom, four—namely α0, . . . , α3—more than affine struc-
ture; αµ = 〈α, ∂µ〉. We can write
〈dxµ,Πα∂ν∂κ〉 = Γµνκ + δµνακ + δµκαν ,
39P. 135: “Der metrische Charakter (Kru¨mmung) des vierdimensionalen raumzeitlichen Kontinuums wird
nach der allgemeinen Relativita¨tstheorie in jedem Punkte durch die daselbst befindliche Materie und deren
Zustand bestimmt.”
40We only know that test bodies follow geodesics, as an anonymous reviewer has emphasised. Bodies
large enough to influence projective structure may be guided by it in a different way: “Since we do not
know how to solve Einstein’s equations with matter, we do not know whether ‘dynamical masses’ follow
geodesics.”
41Cf. Dorato (2007).
42See footnote 1, and Weyl (1921); or Malament (2006, p. 233) for a more modern treatment.
43Or alternatively the unparametrised geodesics, in other words just the image I(σ) = I(σ0) ⊂M .
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where the Γµνκ are the components of the Levi-Civita connection. The most meaningful
part of the added freedom appears to be the ‘acceleration’
λ = −2〈α, σ˙〉 = −2αµ dσ
µ
ds
= −
(
ds
ds0
)2
d2s0
ds2
of the parameter s along the generalised geodesic σ determined by Πα.
In fact not all of the added freedom in projective structure is empirically available:
as ‘second clock effects’ are never seen, α really should be exact.44 We have to make
a choice, and will take affine structure to represent inertia; but if (duly restricted) pro-
jective structure is preferred, the arithmetic can be adjusted accordingly.45
3.4 Curvature and low-dimensional idealisations
Before moving on to the underdetermination of inertia by matter we should consider the
extent to which curvature interferes with low-dimensional (zero- or one-dimensional)
idealisations that have a role here. We have associated inertia with the geodesics
of a connection;46 and a geodesic is a (parametrised) one-dimensional manifold, a
worldline that (if timelike) can be described by an ideally small—essentially zero-
dimensional—object with negligible mass and spatial extension. Masses can be large
enough to produce observable distortions of space-time—or small enough to distort
only unmeasurably: whatever the threshold of instrumental sensitivity, masses falling
below the threshold can always be found. And even if the relationships between the
worldlines making up the worldtube of an extended object may not be uninteresting—
their geodesic deviation will not always vanish—there will always be geodesics whose
separation is small enough to bring geodesic deviation under the threshold of measur-
ability.
Synge (1964, pp. ix-x) was
never [ . . . ] able to understand th[e] principle [of equivalence]. [ . . . ] Does
it mean that the effects of a gravitational field are indistinguishable from
the effects of an observer’s acceleration? If so, it is false. In Einstein’s
theory, either there is a gravitational field or there is none, according as
the Riemann tensor does not or does vanish. This is an absolute property;
it has nothing to do with any observer’s world-line.
It is doubtless right to distinguish between curvature and flatness; but also between
mathematical distinguishability and experimental distinguishability.
44See Afriat (2009) and Ehlers, Pirani & Schild (1972). We thank an anonymous referee for reminding us
about second clock effects.
45The four additional degrees of freedom would be subject to the differential restriction dα = 0; the
two-form dα has six independent quantities.
46Cf. Lusanna (2007, p. 79): “a global vision of the equivalence principle implies that only global non-
inertial frames exist in general relativity [ . . . ].” In other words: since low-dimensional frames are too small
to make sense, they have to be global; global frames are too large to be inertial; hence only non-inertial
frames can be countenanced in general relativity.
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[ . . . ] The Principle of Equivalence performed the essential office of mid-
wife at the birth of general relativity, but, as Einstein remarked, the in-
fant would never have got beyond its long-clothes had it not been for
Minkowski’s concept. I suggest that the midwife be now buried with ap-
propriate honours and the facts of absolute space-time faced.
We suggest more tolerance for the midwife, and certainly not burial; for even in a
curved region one can always find a cell (‘Einstein’s elevator’) small enough to make
tidal effects experimentally negligible throughout.47 Of course an elevator that’s small
enough for one level of instrumental sensitivity may not be for another. The strategy is
familiar from analysis: for any tolerance ε > 0 one can always find a δ that gives rise
to effective indistinguishability by falling under the tolerance. Mathematical physics is
full of linear approximations; one often takes the first term in a Taylor expansion and
ignores the others.
Tidal effects already get ‘idealised away’ in the sixth corollary (to the laws), where
Newton points out that a system of bodies48 will be indifferent49 to a common “ac-
celerative force.”50 He presumably means a ‘universal’ force subjecting all of them to
the same acceleration, and clearly has gravity in mind—which he doesn’t mention ex-
plicitly, however, as it would produce tidal effects at odds with the claimed invariance.
He idealises the difficulty away by specifying conditions that would (strictly speak-
ing) be incompatible if the accelerations were indeed gravitational: they have to be
“equal”51—which would put the bodies at the same distance from the source—and in
the same direction52—which would align them along the same ray. Together the two
conditions would confine the bodies to the same spot. Here too, then, there is a sense
in which gravity can only be transformed away at a point. The absence of curvature
nonetheless makes inertia easier to represent in Newtonian mechanics, where it can be
‘global’ (rather than low-dimensional), since geodesic deviation vanishes everywhere;
but as we are wondering to what extent the ‘relative’ inertia of general relativity repre-
sents a satisfactory response to the absolute inertia of Newtonian mechanics, we have
to represent inertia in general relativity too. Affine structure seems to capture it well—
even if real objects are extended and distort space-time.
Then there is the Wegtransformierbarkeit of gravitational energy. Though punctual
(zero-dimensional) Wegtransformierbarkeit has the merit of being logically clean—
some objects satisfy it, others don’t—it may perhaps be too easily satisfied to be mean-
ingful. Larger domains tend to make it harder; they complicate the logic and mathemat-
ics of Wegtransformierbarkeit by introducing differential constraints tying the fates of
47Cf. Lusanna (2007, p. 80): “Special relativity can be recovered only locally by a freely falling observer
in a neighborhood where tidal effects are negligible,” and p. 91: “[the equivalence principle] suggested [ . . . ]
the impossibility to distinguish a uniform gravitational field from the effects of a constant acceleration by
means of local experiments in sufficiently small regions where the effects of tidal forces are negligible.”
48“corpora moveantur quomodocunque inter se”
49“pergent omnia eodem modo moveri inter se, ac si viribus illis non essent incitata,” “corpora omnia
æqualiter (quoad velocitatem) movebunt per legem II. ideoque nunquam mutabunt positiones et motus eorum
inter se.”
50“a viribus acceleratricibus æqualibus”
51“æqualibus,” “æqualiter”
52“secundum lineas parallelas”
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certain points to those of others. Curvature might appear to prevent broader Wegtrans-
formierbarkeit quite generally, but non-vanishing connection components do not keep
tµν from vanishing: Schro¨dinger (1918) proposed coordinates that make t
µ
ν vanish ev-
erywhere in an entirely curved universe; so one should not even think of a ‘bump in the
carpet’ that can be moved around but not altogether eliminated. As we shall see in §3.8,
Einstein (1918c) made Schro¨dinger’s example look pathological by showing that two
objects (kept apart by a rod!) are enough to prevent tµν from vanishing everywhere. But
since useful general statements (like a satisfactory classification of cases) about how tµν
is affected by coordinate transformations over an arbitrary region seem hard to make,
one is tempted to stick to a single point—where the logic of Wegtransformierbarkeit
is simplified by depending on the object in question alone. Though many quasi-local
characterisations of matter-energy have been proposed, they all appear to have their
shortcomings; Szabados (2004, p. 9) writes:
However, contrary to the high expectations of the eighties, finding an ap-
propriate quasi-local notion of energy-momentum has proven to be sur-
prisingly difficult. Nowadays, the state of the art is typically postmodern:
Although there are several promising and useful suggestions, we have not
only no ultimate, generally accepted expression for the energy-momentum
and especially for the angular momentum, but there is no consensus in the
relativity community even on general questions (for example, what should
we mean e.g. by energy-momentum: only a general expression containing
arbitrary functions, or rather a definite one free of any ambiguities, even of
additive constants), or on the list of the criteria of reasonableness of such
expressions. The various suggestions are based on different philosophies,
approaches and give different results in the same situation. Apparently,
the ideas and successes of one construction have only very little influence
on other constructions.
The impressive efforts devoted to such constructions are no doubt due to a sense that
the legitimacy energy and its conservation rightly have in the rest of physics must be
extended to general relativity, however badly they get complicated or even compro-
mised by curvature and path-dependence. Without attempting a serious evaluation of
the fruits such efforts have yielded we will confine ourselves to punctual Wegtrans-
formierbarkeit, which is mathematically more straightforward and tractable, and logi-
cally much cleaner than broader kinds.
The physical significance of tensors is, incidentally, not unrelated to these matters—
a tensor being an object that cannot be transformed away; but at a point. A field that’s
wegtransformierbar at a point may not be more broadly.
3.5 The underdetermination of inertia by matter
We can now try to characterise and quantify the underdetermination, at a point, of
inertia by matter. The relationship between affine structure and curvature is given by
Bµνκλ = 2Γ
µ
ν[λ,κ] + Γ
τ
νλΓ
µ
τκ − Γ τνκΓµτλ.
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The curvature tensor Babcd has ninety-six (6× 42) independent quantities, eighty if the
connection is symmetric, only twenty if it is metric, in which case Babcd becomes the
Riemann tensor Rabcd. Einstein’s equation expresses the equality of the matter tensor
Tab and Einstein tensor
Gab = Rab − 1
2
Rgab,
where the Ricci scalar R is the contraction gabRab of the Ricci tensor Rab = Rcacb.
Many Riemann tensors therefore correspond to the same Ricci tensor, to the same
Einstein tensor. By removing the ten freedom degrees of a symmetric index pair, the
contraction Rab = Rcacb leaves the ten independent quantities of the Ricci tensor; the
lost freedoms end up in the Weyl tensor
Cabcd = Rabcd − ga[cRd]b + gb[cRd]a + 1
3
Rga[cgd]b.
To the disappointment of the relationist, local matter would therefore seem to underde-
termine inertia by ten degrees of freedom—some of which may prove less meaningful
than others, however, as we shall soon see. But whatever the meaning of the laxity
between inertia and matter, their relationship already looks more balanced than before,
for now there is interaction: besides guiding matter, inertial (i.e. affine) structure is also
constrained by it. Of course this impression of apparent balance or justice, however en-
couraging, does not settle the issue—the guidance after all leaves no freedom, perhaps
the constraint shouldn’t either. In fact we still have every reason to wonder about the
way matter constrains inertia in general relativity.
Before we see how inertia is constrained by the simplest configuration of matter—
its complete absence—in the linear approximation, let us consider a point raised by
Ehlers53 and others: matter-energy would appear to make no sense without the metric.
How can matter-energy underdetermine a more fundamental object that it requires and
presupposes?
To begin with, no metric is needed to make sense of one conceptually important
matter-energy tensor, namely T ab = 0. The next-simplest matter-energy tensor is
T ab = ρV aV b (‘dust’), with matrix representation
ρ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 .
To rule out tachyonic dust one may seem to need the metric, to impose gabV aV b < 0;
but since conformally equivalent metrics eλgab all agree, in the sense that
[gabV
aV b < 0]⇔ [eλgabV aV b < 0]
53Ehlers (1995, p. 467): “So far, any description of the properties and states of matter involves a metric as
an indispensible ingredient. Consequently, quite apart from mathematical technicalities the idea that “matter
determines the metric” cannot even be meaningfully formulated. Besides matter variables, a metric [ . . . ]
seems to be needed as an independent, primitive concept in physics [ . . . ].” We thank an anonymous referee
for having brought this up.
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for every λ, conformal structure is enough. The next-simplest matter-energy tensor is
Tab = ρVaVb + p(gab + VaVb),
with matrix 
ρ 0 0 0
0 p 0 0
0 0 p 0
0 0 0 p
 .
The number p typically gets identified with pressure, which does involve the metric,
being defined as force per unit area, or distance squared. The metric is also needed to
raise and lower indices: to turn V a into Va or gab into gab, or even (by converting Tab
into T ab ) to speak of ρ or p as eigenvalues, or of V
a as an eigenvector. Electromag-
netism in general relativity also requires the metric, which appears in the second term
of the energy-momentum tensor
Tab =
1
4pi
(
FacF
c
b −
1
4
gabFdeF
de
)
,
and is also needed to relate Fab or F ab to F ab . But even if we have decided to represent
matter with T ab however it is constituted, the ‘materiality’ of pure electromagnetism
is suspect and open to question; it can be viewed as lower-grade stuff than dust, for
instance. And it must be remembered that we are interested in the relationship between
matter and inertia: admittedly inertia is closely related to the metric in standard general
relativity (by∇g = 0); but that relationship, which can be seen as contingent, has been
relaxed by Einstein (1925)54 and others.
Generally, then, the reliance of matter on the metric seems to depend on the kind
of matter; in particular on how rich, structured and complicated it is. The simplest
matter—absent matter—can do without the metric; the more frills it acquires, the more
it will need the metric. We shall continue to explore the underdetermination of inertia
by matter, which will be altogether absent in §3.6 and can otherwise be thought of—
with a loss of generality that needn’t be too troubling—as a pressureless dust.55
To understand how gauge choices eliminate eight degrees of freedom let us now
turn to gravitational waves56 in the linear approximation.
3.6 Inertia without matter
Through Einstein’s equation, then, matter determines the rough curvature given by
the Ricci tensor. The absence of matter,57 for instance, makes that curvature vanish
54The connection and metric were first varied independently by Einstein (1925), but he, misled by Pauli,
wrongly attributed the method to Palatini (1919)—who had in fact varied the metric connection; see Ferraris
et al. (1982).
55A world made of dust or nothing may seem a trifle arid. In principle it could be enriched by the six
freedom degrees of the symmetric tensor Tij , whose eigenvalues p1, p2 and p3 would, if different, indicate a
curious spatial anisotropy; to avoid which Tij is taken to be degenerate, with eigenvalue p = p1 = p2 = p3,
so that only a single quantity gets typically added to the four of dust. Less arid, but barely . . .
56For a recent and readable account see Kennefick (2007).
57Einstein (1917a, p. 132), it is worth mentioning, wrote that without matter there is no inertia at all: “In a
consistent theory of relativity there can be no inertia with respect to ‘space,’ but only an inertia of the masses
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identically—but not the more detailed Riemann curvature, which can oscillate nonethe-
less, and in many different ways. Here we will see the purely ‘Weyl’ freedom left by
the absence of matter.
The weak perturbation hµν = gµν − ηµν would (being symmetrical) first appear
to maintain the ten freedoms of the Weyl tensor. It is customary to write γµν =
hµν − 12ηµνh, where h is the trace hµµ. A choice of coordinates satisfying the four
continuity conditions ∂νγµν = 0 allows us to set γµ0 = 0, which does away with the
four ‘temporal’ freedoms. There remains a symmetric ‘purely spatial’ matrix
0 0 0 0
0 γ11 γ21 γ31
0 γ21 γ22 γ32
0 γ31 γ32 γ33

with six degrees of freedom. We can also make h vanish, which brings us back to
hµν = γµν and eliminates another freedom, leaving five. To follow the fates of these
remaining freedoms we can consider the plane harmonic
(3) hµν = Re{Aµνei〈k,x〉}
obeying hµν = 0. If the wave equation were chµν = (∂20 − c2∇2)hµν = 0 in-
stead, with arbitrary c, the wave (co)vector k would have four independent components
kµ = 〈k, ∂µ〉:
• the direction k1 : k2 : k3, in other words k/|k| (two)
• the length |k| =
√
k21 + k
2
2 + k
2
3 (one)
• the frequency ω = k0 = 〈k, ∂0〉 = c|k| (one).
Since c = 1 is a natural constant, the condition hµν = 0 reduces them to three, by
identifying |k| and ω, which makes the squared length kaka = k0k0 − |k|2 vanish.
And even these three degrees of freedom disappear into the coordinates if the wave
is made to propagate along the third spatial axis, which can be recalibrated to match
the wavelength, leaving two (5− 3) freedoms, of polarisation. The three orthogonality
relations
3∑
j=1
Aijk
j =
3∑
j=1
A(∂i, ∂j)〈dxja, ka〉 = 0
(i = 1, 2, 3) follow from ∂νγµν = 0 and situate the polarisation tensor A with com-
ponents Aij in the plane k⊥ ⊂ k⊥ orthogonal to the three-vector k ∈ k⊥. Once
the coordinates are realigned and recalibrated so that 〈k, ∂3〉 = 1 and 〈k, ∂1〉, 〈k, ∂2〉
both vanish, the three componentsA(∂3, ∂j) also vanish, leaving a traceless symmetric
matrix 
0 0 0 0
0 h11 h21 0
0 h21 −h11 0
0 0 0 0

with respect to one another.”
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with two independent components, h11 = −h22 and h12 = h21.
The above gauge choices therefore eliminate eight degrees of freedom:
• the four ‘temporal’ coordinates γµ0 eliminated by the conditions ∂νγµν = 0
• the freedom eliminated by h = 0
• the three freedoms of k eliminated by realignment and recalibration.
One may wonder about the use of an only ‘linearly’ covariant approximation in a
paper that so insistently associates physical legitimacy with general covariance. The
linear approximation has been adopted as the simplest way of illustrating how two
degrees of freedom remain after gauge choices eliminate eight; but the same count
(2 = 10 − 8) can be shown, though much less easily, to hold in general. Very briefly:
The ten vacuum field equations Gµν = 0 are not independent, being constrained58
by the four contracted Bianchi identities ∇aGa0 = · · · = ∇aGa3 = 0; another four
degrees freedom are lost to constraints on the initial data, leaving two.59 For details
we refer the reader to Lusanna (2007, pp. 95-6), Lusanna & Pauri (2006a, pp. 696,
699, 706-7) and Lusanna & Pauri (2006b, pp. 193-4); but should point out that their
(related) agenda makes them favour a different, ‘canonical’ (or ‘double’) arithmetic
(2 · 2 = 2 · [10 − 4 − 4]) of freedom degrees provided by the ADM Hamiltonian
formalism, which they use to distinguish between four—two configurational and two
canonically conjugate—“ontic” (or “tidal” or “gravitational”) quantities and the re-
maining “epistemic” (or “inertial” or “gauge”) degrees of freedom.60 The ontic-tidal-
gravitational quantities—the Dirac observables—are not numerically invariant61 under
the group G8 of gauge transformations; Lusanna & Pauri seem to view a gauge choice
Γ8 ∈ G8 as determining a specific realisation (or ‘coordinatisation’?) ‘Ω4 = Γ8(Ω˜4)’
of a single “abstract” four-dimensional symplectic space Ω˜4.62 The ontic state can per-
haps be understood as an invariant point ω ∈ Ω˜4, which acquires the four components
{q1(ω), . . . , p2(ω)} ∈ Ω4 with respect to the coordinates q1, q2, p1, p2 characterising
a particular Ω4. At any rate, Lusanna & Pauri use the four ontic-tidal-gravitational
observables to
• individuate space-time points
58See Brading & Ryckman (2008) and Ryckman (2008) on Hilbert’s struggle, with similar constraints, to
reconcile causality and general covariance.
59In the general nonlinear case the two remaining freedoms can be harder to recognise as polarisations of
gravitational waves; Lusanna & Pauri speak of the “two autonomous degrees of freedom of the gravitational
field.” But having based our arithmetic on the linear approximation we will continue to speak of polarisation.
60Lusanna & Pauri also take the four eigenvalues of the Weyl tensor, and gravitational ‘observables’
characterised in various ways by Bergmann & Komar, to express ‘genuine gravity’ as opposed to mere
‘inertial appearances.’
61But Lusanna (2007, p. 101): “Conjecture: there should exist privileged Shanmugadhasan canonical
bases of phase space, in which the DO (the tidal effects) are also Bergmann observables, namely coordinate-
independent (scalar) tidal effects.”
62See Lusanna & Pauri (2006a, pp. 706-7); and also Lusanna (2007, p. 101): “The reduced phase space
of this model of general relativity is the space of abstract DO (pure tidal effects without inertial effects),
which can be thought as four fields on an abstract space-time M˜4 = equivalence class of all the admissible
non-inertial frames M43+1 containing the associated inertial effects.”
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• ‘dis-solve’ the hole argument63
• argue that change is possible in canonical gravity, for the ‘ontic’ quantities can
evolve.64
Since so much hangs on their four observables, Lusanna & Pauri emphasise—with
detailed metrological considerations—that they really are observable, and go into pos-
sible schemes for their measurement. In §3.15 we propose a Doppler effect in a similar
spirit; but let us now return to the two (configurational, as opposed to canonical) de-
grees of freedom left by the eight gauge choices.
The physical meaning of coordinate transformations has been amply discussed,
notably in the literature on the hole argument.65 The relationist will take the eight
degrees freedom eliminated by the above gauge choices to be meaningless,66 to lessen
the underdetermination of inertia—and because as a relationist he would anyway. We
will too, and concentrate on the status of the double freedom of polarisation.67
Matter still underdetermines inertia, then, by two degrees freedom, which obstruct
the satisfaction of ‘Mach’s principle,’ as we are calling it. But are they really there?
Or do they share the fate of the eight freedoms eliminated by gauge choices, which we
have dismissed as physically meaningless? The relationist may prefer to discard them
too as an empty mathematical fiction without physical consequence; but we know their
physical meaning is bound up with that of gravitational waves, whose polarisation they
represent.
We should emphasise that the formalism of general relativity (especially in its La-
grangian and Hamiltonian versions) distinguishes clearly between the eight degrees of
63They point out that the diffeomorphism at issue is constrained by the fixed Cauchy data to be purely
‘epistemic’ and not ‘ontic’; the covariance is not general.
64The Hamiltonian acting on the reduced phase space is not constant in asymptotically flat space-times,
where consistency requires the addition of a (De Witt surface) term generating a genuine ‘ontic’ evolution;
see Lusanna (2007, p. 97), for instance. Cf. Belot & Earman (2001, §§4-6) for a complementary discus-
sion of time and change in canonical gravity; or Earman (2006) p. 451: “In the case of GTR the price of
saving determinism is a frozen picture of the world in which the observables do not change over time.”
Where the space-time is spatially compact, with no boundary, the ‘ontic’ quantities—Earman speaks of
“observables”—remain unchanged as no surface term has to be added to the (constant ‘ontic’) Hamiltonian
governing their evolution. Time evolution XH = (dH)# is after all generated by the differential dH of the
Hamiltonian, which vanishes if the Hamiltonian is constant—for instance if it vanishes identically. We thank
an anonymous referee for added precision on this matter.
65See Earman & Norton (1987), Butterfield (1987, 1989), Norton (1988), Earman (1989, §9), Maudlin
(1993), Stachel (1993), Rynasiewicz (1994), Belot (1996), Belot & Earman (1999, 2001), Ryckman (2005,
pp. 19-23), Earman (2006), Dorato & Pauri (2006), Lusanna & Pauri (2006a), Lusanna (2007, pp. 99-100),
Rovelli (2007, §2.2.5), Esfeld & Lam (2008, §2) for instance.
66Cf. Rovelli (2007, §2.3.2).
67Cf. Earman (2006) p. 444: “In what could be termed the classical phase of the debate, the focus was
on coordinate systems and the issue of whether equations of motion/field equations transform in a generally
covariant manner under an arbitrary coordinate transformation. But from the perspective of the new ground
the substantive requirement of general covariance is not about the status of coordinate systems or covariance
properties of equations under coordinate transformation; indeed, from the new perspective, such matters
cannot hold any real interest for physics since the content of space-time theories [ . . . ] can be characterised
in a manner that does not use or mention coordinate systems. Rather, the substantive requirement of general
covariance lies in the demand that diffeomorphism invariance is a gauge symmetry of the theory at issue.”
A distinction between physically meaningful and mere gauge is at the heart of the new perspective. Cf.
Lusanna (2007, p. 104): “the true physical degrees of freedom [ . . . ] are the gauge invariant quantities, the
Dirac observables (DO).”
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freedom eliminated by gauge choices and the remaining two representing polarisation.
We are not claiming that all ten (= 8 + 2) are theoretically, mathematically on an equal
footing, for they are not; we are merely wondering about the physical meaning of the
two that cannot be eliminated by gauge choices. The claim that the physical meaning of
these two polarisations is related to the status of gravitational waves seems relatively
uncontentious—unlike the much more alarming claim (which we are undeniably as-
sessing, but not making) that gravitational waves are a physically unreal mathematical
fiction.
3.7 Gravitational waves, transformation behaviour and reality
To deal with the polarisation obstructing a full determination of inertia the relationist
can insist on the right transformation behaviour, which gravitational waves do not seem
to have, in various senses. He will argue that as the generation and energy, perhaps even
the detection of gravitational waves can be transformed away, they and the underdeter-
mination of inertia by matter are about as fictitious as the eight freedoms that have just
disappeared into the coordinates.
If gravitational waves had mass-energy their reality could be hard to contest.68 We
have seen that general relativity does allow the attribution of mass-energy to the gravi-
tational field, to gravitational waves, through the pseudotensor tµν ; but also that t
µ
ν has
the wrong transformation behaviour.
Is the physical meaning of tµν really compromised by its troubling susceptibility
69
to disappear, and reappear under acceleration? A similar question arose in §3.1, when
we wondered what to count as matter. There we did not provide the relationist with
the ‘gravitational matter’ that would have favoured his agenda by making his princi-
ples easier to satisfy, on grounds that, being mere ‘opinion,’ it was too insubstantial
and tenuous to count. To be fair to the relationist we should perhaps dismiss tµν once
more as mere opinion. But we have no reason to be fair, and are merely exploring cer-
tain logical possibilities. Perhaps ‘matter’ was something stronger, and required more;
maybe a quantity that comes and goes with the accelerations of the observer can be real
despite being immaterial; so we shall treat the physical meaning of tµν—as opposed to
its suitability for the representation of matter—as a further issue.
General relativity has been at the centre of a tradition, conspicuously associated
with Hilbert (1924, pp. 261 (Teil I), 276-8 (Teil II)),70 Levi-Civita (1917, p. 382),
Schro¨dinger (1918, pp. 6-7; 1926, p. 492), Cassirer (1921), Einstein (1990, pp. 5, 13)
himself eventually, Langevin (1922, pp. 31, 54), Meyerson (1925, §48), Russell (1927,
§VII) and Weyl (2000, §17), linking physical reality or objectivity or significance to
appropriate transformation properties, to something along the lines of invariance or
covariance.71 Roots can be sought as far back as Democritus, who is said to have
68Cf. Dorato (2000): “Furthermore, the gravitational field has momentum energy, therefore mass (via the
equivalence between mass and energy) and having mass is a typical feature of substances.”
69This issue is logically straightforward at a single point, where it only depends on the object in question
(here tµν ); the logic of broader Wegtransformierbarkeit is much messier, depending on the nature of the
region, the presence of cosmic rods etc.; see §3.4, and Einstein’s reply in §3.8.
70See also Brading & Ryckman (2008) and Ryckman (2008).
71Covariance and invariance are rightly conflated in much of the literature, and here too. Whether it is
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claimed that “sweet, bitter, hot, cold, colour” are mere opinion, “only atoms and
void”—concerning which there ought in principle to be better agreement—“are real”;
or more recently in Felix Klein’s ‘Erlangen programme’ (1872), which based geomet-
rical relevance on invariance under the groups he used to classify geometries. Bertrand
Russell, in his version of neutral monism,72 identified objects with the class of their
appearances from different points of view—not really an association of invariance
and reality, but an attempt to transcend the misleading peculiarities of individual per-
spectives nonetheless. Hilbert explicitly required invariance in “Die Grundlagen der
Physik,” denying physical significance to objects with the wrong transformation prop-
erties. Levi-Civita, Schro¨dinger (1918) and Bauer (1918, p. 165), who saw the relation
of physical meaning to appropriate transformation properties as a central feature of rel-
ativity theory, likewise questioned73 the significance of the energy-momentum pseu-
dotensor. Schro¨dinger noted that appropriate coordinates make tµν vanish identically
in a curved space-time (containing only one body); Bauer that certain ‘accelerated’
coordinates would give energy-momentum to flat regions.
Einstein first seemed happy to extend physical meaning to objects with the wrong
transformation properties. In January 1918 he upheld the reality of tµν in a paper on
gravitational waves:
[Levi-Civita] (and with him other colleagues) is opposed to the emphasis
of equation [∂ν(Tνσ + t
ν
σ) = 0] and against the aforementioned interpreta-
tion, because the tνσ do not make up a tensor. Admittedly they do not; but
I cannot see why physical meaning should only be ascribed to quantities
with the transformation properties of tensor components.74
3.8 Einstein’s reply to Schro¨dinger
In February (1918c) Einstein responded to Schro¨dinger’s objection, arguing that with
more than one body the stresses tij transmitting gravitational interactions would not
vanish: Take two bodies M1 and M2 kept apart by a rigid rod R aligned along ∂1.
M1 is enclosed in a two-surface ∂Θ which leaves out M2 and hence cuts R (orthogo-
nally one can add, for simplicity). Integrating over the three-dimensional region Θ, the
conservation law ∂νUνµ = 0 yields
d
dx0
∫
Θ
U0µd
3x =
∫
∂Θ
3∑
i=1
U iµd
2Σi :
a number or Gestalt or syntax or the appearance of a law that remains unchanged is less the point than the
generality—complete or linear or Lorentz, for instance—of the transformations at issue.
72Accounts can be found in Russell (1921, 1927, 1956). But see also Russell (1991, p. 14), which was
first published in 1912. Cf. Cassirer (1921, p. 36).
73See Cattani & De Maria (1993).
74Einstein (1918b, p. 167): “[Levi-Civita] (und mit ihm auch andere Fachgenossen) ist gegen eine Beto-
nung der Gleichung [∂ν(Tνσ + t
ν
σ) = 0] und gegen die obige Interpretation, weil die t
ν
σ keinen T e n s o r
bilden. Letzteres ist zuzugeben; aber ich sehe nicht ein, warum nur solchen Gro¨ßen eine physikalische
Bedeutung zugeschrieben werden soll, welche die Transformationseigenschaften von Tensorkomponenten
haben.”
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any change in the total energy
∫
U0µd
3x enclosed in Θ would be due to a flow, repre-
sented on the right-hand side, through the boundary ∂Θ (where Uµν is again T
µ
ν + t
µ
ν ,
and d3x stands for dx1 ∧ dx2 ∧ dx3; we have replaced Einstein’s cosines with a nota-
tion similar to the one used, for instance, in Misner et al. (1973)). Since the situation is
stationary and there are no flows, both sides of the equation vanish, for µ = 0, 1, 2, 3.
Einstein takes µ = 1 and uses ∫
∂Θ
3∑
i=1
U i1d
2Σi = 0.
He is very concise, and leaves out much more than he writes, but we are presumably
to consider the intersection R ∩ ∂Θ of rod and enclosing surface, where it seems ∂1 is
orthogonal to ∂2 and ∂3, which means the off-diagonal components T 21 and T
3
1 vanish,
unlike the component T 11 along R. Since
−
∫
∂Θ
3∑
i=1
ti1d
2Σi
must be something like T 11 times the sectional area ofR, the three gravitational stresses
ti1 cannot all vanish identically. The argument is swift, contrived and full of gaps,
but the conclusion that gravitational stresses between two (or more) bodies cannot be
‘transformed away’ seems valid.
Then in May we again find Einstein lamenting that
Colleagues are opposed to this formulation [of conservation] because (Uνσ)
and (tνσ) are not tensors, while they expect all physically significant quan-
tities to be expressed by scalars or tensor components.75
In the same paper he defends his controversial energy conservation law,76 which we
shall soon come to.
3.9 Conservation under coordinate substitutions
Conservation is bound to cause trouble in general relativity. The idea usually is that
even if the conserved quantity—say a ‘fluid’ with density ρ—doesn’t stay put, even
if it moves and gets transformed, an appropriate total over space nonetheless persists
through time; a spatial integral remains constant:
(4)
d
dt
∫
ρ d3x = 0.
So a clean separation into space (across which the integral is taken) and time (in the
course of which the integral remains unchanged) seems to be presupposed when one
75Einstein (1918d, p. 447): “Diese Formulierung sto¨ßt bei den Fachgenossen deshalb auf Widerstand, weil
(Uνσ) und (t
ν
σ) keine Tensoren sind, wa¨hrend sie erwarten, daß alle fu¨r die Physik bedeutsamen Gro¨ßen sich
als Skalare und Tensorkomponenten auffassen lassen mu¨ssen.”
76See Hoefer (2000) on the difficulties of energy conservation.
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speaks of conservation. In relativity the separation suggests a Minkowskian orthogo-
nality
(5) ∂0 ⊥ span{∂1, ∂2, ∂3}
between time and space,77 which already restricts the class of admissible transforma-
tions and hence the generality of any covariance. However restricted, the class will
be far from empty; and what if the various possible integrals it admits give different
results? Or if some are conserved and others aren’t?
An integral law like (4) can typically be reformulated as a ‘local’ divergence law
∂ρ
∂t
+∇ · j = 0,
which in four dimensions reads ∂µJµ = 0, where j stands for the current density ρv,
the three-vector v represents the three-velocity of the fluid, J0 is the density ρ and
J i equals 〈dxi, j〉. But the integral law is primary; the divergence law derived from it
only really expresses conservation to the extent that it is fully equivalent to the more
fundamental integral law. As Einstein puts it:
From the physical point of view this equation [∂Tνσ/∂xν +
1
2g
µν
σ Tµν = 0]
cannot be considered completely equivalent to the conservation laws of
momentum and energy, since it does not correspond to integral equations
which can be interpreted as conservation laws of momentum and energy.78
In flat space-time, with inertial coordinates, the divergence law ∂µTµν = 0 can be
unambiguously integrated to express a legitimate conservation law. But the ordinary
divergence ∂µTµν only vanishes in free fall (where it coincides with ∇aT aν ), and oth-
erwise registers the gain or loss seen by an accelerated observer. If such variations are
to be viewed as exchanges with the environment and not as definitive acquisitions or
losses, account of them can be taken with tµν , which makes ∂µ(T
µ
ν +t
µ
ν ) vanish by com-
pensating the difference.79 The generally covariant condition ∂µ(Tµν + t
µ
ν ) = 0, which
is equivalent to ∇aT aν = 0 and ∂µTµν + 12∂νgabTab = 0, can also be unambiguously
integrated in flat space-time to express a legitimate conservation law. But integration
is less straightforward in curved space-time, where it involves a distant comparison of
direction which cannot be both generally covariant and integrable.
Nothing prevents us from comparing the values of a genuine scalar at distant points.
But we know the density of mass-energy transforms according to
(ρ,0) 7→ ρ√
1− |v|2 (1,v),
77Cf. Einstein (1918d, p. 450).
78Einstein (1918d, p. 449): “Vom physikalischen Standpunkt aus kann diese Gleichung nicht als vollw-
ertiges A¨quivalent fu¨r die Erhaltungssa¨tze des Impulses und der Energie angesehen werden, weil ihr nicht
Integralgleichungen entsprechen, die als Erhaltungssa¨tze des Impulses und der Energie gedeutet werden
ko¨nnen.”
79Cf. Brading & Ryckman (2008, p. 136).
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where v is the three-velocity of the observer. So the invariant quantity is not the mass-
energy density, but (leaving aside the stresses that only make matters worse) the mass-
energy-momentum density, which is manifestly directional. And how are distant direc-
tions to be compared? Comparison of components is not invariant: directions or rather
component ratios equal with respect to one coordinate system may differ in another.
Comparison by parallel transport will depend not on the coordinate system, but on the
path followed.
3.10 Einstein’s defence of energy conservation
Einstein tries to get around the problem in “Der Energiesatz in der allgemeinen Rel-
ativita¨tstheorie” (1918d). Knowing that conservation is unproblematic in flat space-
time, where parallel transport is integrable, he makes the universe look as Minkowskian
as possible by keeping all the mass-energy spoiling the flatness neatly circumscribed
(which is already questionable, for matter may be infinite).
Einstein attributes an energy-momentum J to the universe, which he legitimates by
imposing a kind of ‘general’ (but in fact restricted) invariance on each component Jµ,
defined as the spatial integral
Jµ =
∫
U0µd
3x
of the combined energy-momentum U0µ = T
0
µ + t
0
µ of matter and field (where U
µ
ν =
Uµν
√−g etc., and the stresses seem to be neglected). To impose it he separates time and
space through (5), and requires the fields Tµν and t
µ
ν to vanish outside a bounded region
B. Einstein is prudently vague about B, which is first part of a simultaneity slice Σt,
and then gets “infinitely extended in the time direction,”80 to produce the world tube
B∂0 described byB along the integral curves of the “time direction” ∂0. The supportsT
and t of Tµν and t
µ
ν are contained inB∂0 by definition; but Tmay be much smaller than t
and henceB∂0 : we have no reason to assume that T does not contain bodies that radiate
gravitational waves—of which tµν would have to take account—along the lightcones
delimiting the causal future of Tt = T ∩ Σt. Gravitational waves could therefore, by
obliging B∂0 to be much larger than T, spoil the picture of an essentially Minkowskian
universe barely perturbed by the ‘little clump’ of matter-energy it contains.
The generality of any invariance or covariance is already limited by (5); Einstein
restricts it further by demanding Minkowskian coordinates gµν = ηµν (and hence
flatness) outside B∂0 .
81 He then uses the temporal constancy dJµ/dx0 = 0 of each
component Jµ, which follows from ∂µUµν = 0, to prove that Jµ has the same value
(Jµ)1 = (Jµ)2 on both three-dimensional simultaneity slices82 x0 = t1 and x0 = t2
of coordinate system K; and value (J ′µ)1 = (J
′
µ)2 at x
′0 = t′1 and x
′0 = t′2 in another
system K ′. A third system K ′′ coinciding with K around the slice x0 = t1 and with
K ′ around x′0 = t′2 allows the comparison of K and K
′ across time. The invariance
of each component Jµ follows from (Jµ)1 = (J ′µ)2. Having established that, Einstein
80Einstein (1918d, p. 450)
81Flatness cannot reasonably be demanded of the rest of the universe, as can be seen by giving Tab the
spherical support it has in the Schwarzschild solution, where curvature diminishes radially without ever
vanishing.
82For a recent treatment see Lachie`ze-Rey (2001).
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views the world as a ‘body’ immersed in an otherwise flat space-time, whose energy-
momentum Jµ is covariant under the transformation laws—Lorentz transformations—
considered appropriate83 for that (largely flat) environment. Unusal mixture of trans-
formation properties: four components, each one ‘somewhat’ invariant, which together
make up a four-vector whose Lorentz covariance would be of questionable appropri-
ateness even if the universe were completely flat.
Einstein’s argument was nonetheless effective, and persuaded84 the community,
which became and largely remains more tolerant of objects (including laws and calcu-
lations) with dubious transformation properties.
In §§3.7-8 we saw what Einstein thought in the first months of 1918. Already in
“Dialog u¨ber Einwa¨nde gegen die Relativita¨tstheorie,” which came out in November,
there’s a shift, a timid concession to his opponents, a subtler tolerance. Einstein gives
the impression85 he may have been glad to do away with coordinates, if possible—but
like Cassirer86 he thought it wasn’t: “[ . . . ] cannot do without the coordinate system
[ . . . ].”87 If he had known88 that one can write, say,∇V instead of
(6) ∂µV ν + Γ νµκV
κ,
Einstein would simply have attributed ‘full’ reality to∇V (without bothering with con-
fusing compromises). But he saw the complicated compensation of expressions like (6)
instead, in which various transformations balance each other to produce a less obvious
invariance: “Only certain, generally rather complicated expressions, made up of field
components and coordinates, correspond to coordinate-independent measurable (i.e.
real) quantities.”89 He felt that “the gravitational field [Γµνκ] at a point is neither real
83Despite Kretschmann (1917), who pointed out that even an entirely flat universe can be considered
subject to general (and not just Lorentz) covariance. Cf. Rovelli (2007, §2.4.3).
84See Cattani & De Maria (1993), Hoefer (2000).
85Einstein (1918e), middle of second column
86Cassirer (1921, p. 37)
87Einstein (1918e, p. 699): “Die wissenschaftliche Entwicklung aber hat diese Vermutung nicht besta¨tigt.
Sie kann das Koordinatensystem nicht entbehren, muß also in den Koordinaten Gro¨ßen verwenden, die sich
nicht als Ergebnisse von definierbaren Messungen auffassen lassen.”
88Bertrand Russell (1927, p. 71) was perhaps the first to see the possibility of a formulation we would
now call ‘intrinsic’ or ‘geometrical’: “Reverting now to the method of tensors and its possible eventual
simplification, it seems probable that we have an example of a general tendency to over-emphasise numbers,
which has existed in mathematics ever since the time of Pythagoras, though it was temporarily less prominent
in later Greek geometry as exemplified in Euclid. [ . . . ] Owing to the fact that arithmetic is easy, Greek
methods in geometry have been in the background since Descartes, and co-ordinates have come to seem
indispensable. But mathematical logic has shown that number is logically irrelevant in many problems
where it formerly seemed essential [ . . . ]. A new technique, which seems difficult because it is unfamiliar, is
required when numbers are not used; but there is a compensating gain in logical purity. It should be possible
to apply a similar process of purification to physics. The method of tensors first assigns co-ordinates, and
then shows how to obtain results which, though expressed in terms of co-ordinates, do not really depend upon
them. There must be a less indirect technique possible, in which we use no more apparatus than is logically
necessary, and have a language which will only express such facts as are now expressed in the language of
tensors, not such as depend on the choice of co-ordinates. I do not say that such a method, if discovered,
would be preferable in practice, but I do say that it would give a better expression of the essential relations,
and greatly facilitate the task of the philosopher.”
89Einstein (1918e, p. 699-700): “Nur gewissen, im allgemeinen ziemlich komplizierten Ausdru¨cken, die
aus Feldkomponenten und Koordinaten gebildet werden, entsprechen vom Koordinatensystem unabha¨ngig
meßbare (d. h. reale) Gro¨ßen.” A similar idea is expressed in Hilbert (1924, p. 278, D r i t t e n s. . . . );
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nor merely fictitious”90: not entirely real since it has “part of the arbitrariness”91 of
coordinates; not fictitious because it participates—“the field components [ . . . ] with
whose help we describe physical reality”—in the balancing act yielding invariant real-
ity: “nothing ‘physically real’ corresponds to the gravitational field at a point, only to
the gravitational field in conjunction with other data.”92
3.11 Einstein’s conversion
In May 1921 Einstein seems to have gone a good deal farther, approaching, perhaps
even exceeding the positions of his former opponents:
With the help of speech, different people can compare their experiences to
a certain extent. It turns out that some—but not all—of the sensory expe-
riences of different people will coincide. To such sensory experiences of
different people which, by coinciding, are superpersonal in a certain sense,
there corresponds a reality. The natural sciences, and in particular the most
elementary one, physics, deal with that reality, and hence indirectly with
the totality of such experiences. To such relatively constant experience
complexes corresponds the concept of the physical body, in particular that
of the rigid body.93
Admittedly he only speaks of the “sensory experiences of different people” and not
explicitly of the transformations that convert sensations between them, nor of general
covariance for that matter. Not explicitly, but almost: he eventually mentions physics;
experiences in physics can be called measurements, and they tend to produce numbers;
theory provides the transformations converting the numbers found by one person into
those found by another. For measurements yielding a single number, the interpersonal
‘coincidence’ at issue can be interpreted as numerical equality: only genuine scalars—
the same for everyone—would belong to the ‘superpersonal reality.’ With measure-
ments producing complexes of numbers the notion of ‘coincidence’ upon which reality
cf. Brading & Ryckman (2008, p. 136): “Interestingly, Hilbert here cites the example of energy in general
where the (‘pseudo-tensor density’) expression for the energy-momentum-stress of the gravitational field is
not generally invariant but nonetheless, if defined properly, occurs in the statement of a conservation law that
holds in every frame, i.e., is generally covariant.”
90Einstein (1918e, p. 700): “Man kann deshalb weder sagen, das Gravitationsfeld an einer Stelle sei etwas
”Reales“, noch es sei etwas ”bloß Fiktives“.”91Ibid. p. 699: “Nach der allgemeinen Relativita¨tstheorie sind die vier Koordinaten des raum-zeitlichen
Kontinuums sogar ganz willku¨rlich wa¨hlbare, jeder selbsta¨ndigen physikalischen Bedeutung ermangelnde
Parameter. Ein Teil jener Willku¨r haftet aber auch denjenigen Gro¨ßen (Feldkomponenten) an, mit deren
Hilfe wir die physikalische Realita¨t beschreiben.”
92Ibid. p. 700: “dem Gravitationsfeld an einer Stelle entspricht also noch nichts ”physikalisch Reales“,
wohl aber diesem Gravitationsfelde in Verbindung mit anderen Daten.”
93Einstein (1990, p. 5): “Verschiedene Menschen ko¨nnen mit Hilfe der Sprache ihre Erlebnisse bis zu
einem gewissen Grade miteinander vergleichen. Dabei zeigt sich, daß gewisse sinnliche Erlebnisse ver-
schiedener Menschen einander entsprechen, wa¨hrend bei anderen ein solches Entsprechen nicht festgestellt
werden kann. Jenen sinnlichen Erlebnissen verschiedener Individuen, welche einander entsprechen und
demnach in gewissem Sinne u¨berperso¨nlich sind, wird eine Realita¨t gedanklich zugeordnet. Von ihr, da-
her mittelbar von der Gesamtheit jener Erlebnisse, handeln die Naturwissenschaften, speziell auch deren
elementarste, die Physik. Relativ konstanten Erlebnis-komplexen solcher Art entspricht der Begriff des
physikalischen Ko¨rpers, speziell auch des festen Ko¨rpers.”
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rests is less straightforward: since numerical equality, for each component of the com-
plex, would be much too strong, it will have to be a more holistic kind of correspon-
dence, to do with the way the components change together. Vanishing is an important
criterion: a complex whose components are wegtransformierbar cannot be physically
real—one whose components all vanish cannot ‘coincide’ with one whose components
don’t. Of course the characteristic class of transformations is not the same in every
theory; in general relativity it is the most general class (of transformations satisfying
minimal requirements of continuity and differentiability). So it does not seem unrea-
sonable to interpret the above passage as saying that only generally covariant notions
represent reality in general relativity.
Eight pages on Einstein speaks of geometry in a similar spirit:
In Euclidean geometry it is manifest that only (and all) quantities that can
be expressed as invariants (with respect to linear orthogonal coordinates)
have objective meaning (which does not depend on the particular choice
of the Cartesian system). It is for this reason that the theory of invariants,
which deals with the structural laws of invariants, is significant for analytic
geometry.94
Here “objective meaning” is explicitly attributed to invariance under the characteristic
class of transformations.
In a letter to Paul Painleve´ dated 7 December 1921 Einstein will be even more
explicit, claiming that coordinates and quantities depending on them not only have no
physical meaning, but do not even represent measurement results:
When one replaces r with any function of r in the ds2 of the static spher-
ically symmetric solution, one does not obtain a new solution, for the
quantity r in itself has no physical meaning, meaning possessed only by
the quantity ds itself or rather by the network of all ds’s in the four-
dimensional manifold. One always has to bear in mind that coordinates
in themselves have no physical meaning, which means that they do not
represent measurement results; only the results obtained by the elimina-
tion of coordinates can claim objective meaning.95
94“Offenbar haben in der euklidischen Geometrie nur solche (und alle solche) Gro¨ßen eine objektive (von
der besonderen Wahl des kartesischen Systems unabha¨ngige) Bedeutung, welche sich durch eine Invariante
(bezu¨glich linearer orthogonaler Koordinaten) ausdru¨cken lassen. Hierauf beruht es, daß die Invarianten-
theorie, welche sich mit den Strukturgesetzen der Invariante bescha¨ftigt, fu¨r die analytische Geometrie von
Bedeutung ist.”
95Einstein (1921): “Wenn man in der zentral-symmetrischen statischen Lo¨sung fu¨r ds2 statt r irgend
eine Funktion von r einfu¨gt, so erha¨lt man keine neue Lo¨[su]ng, da die Gro¨sse r an sich keinerlei phy-
sikalische Bedeutung hat, sondern nur die Gro¨sse ds selbst, oder besser gesagt das Netz aller ds in der
vierdimensionalen Mannigfaltigkeit. Es muss stets im Auge behalten werden, dass die Koordinaten an sich
keine physikalische Bedeutung besitzen, das heisst, dass sie keine Messresultate darstellen, nur Ergebnisse,
die durch Elimination der Koordinaten erlangt sind, ko¨nnen objektive Bedeutung beanspruchen. Die metri-
sche Interpretation der Gro¨sse ds ist ferner keine ”pur imagination“, sondern der innerste Kern der ganzen
Theorie. Die Sache verha¨lt sich na¨mlich wie folgt: Gema¨ss der speziellen Relativita¨ts-Theorie sind die Ko-
ordinaten x, y, z, t mittelst relativ zum Koordinaten-System ruhenden Uhren unmittelbar messbar, also hat
auch die Invariante ds, definiert durch die Gleichung ds2 = dt2 − dx2 − dy2 − dz2 die Bedeutung eines
Messergebnisses.”
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The tension with the passages quoted in footnotes 74 and 75 above is not without its
significance for the relationist, who at this point can really question the legitimacy of a
mathematical tolerance whose champion would develop an intransigence surprisingly
reminiscent of the severity expressed by his previous opponents.
One can wonder what made Einstein change his mind, after Levi-Civita, Schro¨dinger
and others had failed to persuade him. At the end of the foreword, dated 9 August
1920, to Cassirer’s Zur Einstein’schen Relativita¨tstheorie (1921) we discover that Ein-
stein had read the manuscript and made comments. There he would have found the
first thorough justification of the mathematical severity his opponents had expressed
a few years before. We know how much the philosophical writings of Hume, Mach
and Poincare´ had influenced Einstein,96 and can conjecture that even here he was fi-
nally persuaded by a philosopher after the best mathematical physicists of the day had
failed.
Be that as it may, it was too late to repent: the damage had been done, the (new)
cause was already lost, and indeed the lenience Einstein promoted in 1918 continues to
this day. General covariance97 is often disregarded or violated in general relativity: if
a calculation works in one coordinate system, too bad if it doesn’t in another; if energy
conservation is upset by peculiar coordinates, never mind.
3.12 Cassirer
Before going on we can briefly consider what Einstein would have found in Cassirer’s
manuscript.
Cassirer welcomed general relativity as confirming, even consolidating a philo-
sophical and scientific tendency he had already described in Substanzbegriff und Funk-
tionsbegriff (1910); a tendency that replaced the obvious things and substances filling
the world of common sense, with abstract theoretical entities, relations and structures.
Even the cruder objects of the naı¨ve previous ontology derived their reality from ‘in-
variances’ of sorts, but only apparent ones—mistakenly perceived by the roughness
of our unassisted senses—which would be replaced by the more abstract and accurate
invariants of modern theory.
Cassirer calls unity “the true goal of science.”98 It appears to have much to do with
economy, of finding
a minimum of assumptions, which are necessary and sufficient to provide
an unambiguous representation of experiences and their systematic con-
text. To preserve, deepen and consolidate this unity, which seemed threat-
ened by the tension between the principle of the constancy of the velocity
of light, and the mechanical principle of relativity, the theory of relativ-
ity abandoned the uniqueness of measurement results for space and time
96See Howard (2005).
97Cf. Norton (1993).
98Cassirer (1921, p. 28): “[die Einheit] ist das wahre Ziel der Wissenschaft. Von dieser Einheit aber hat
der Physiker nicht zu fragen, o b sie ist, sondern lediglich w i e sie ist – d. h. welches das Minimum der
Voraussetzungen ist, die notwendig und hinreichend sind, eine eindeutige Darstellung der Gesamtheit der
Erfahrungen und ihres systematischen Zusammenhangs zu liefern [ . . . ].”
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quantities in different systems.99
Introducing differences where there were none before would seem rather to undermine
or disrupt unity than to produce it . . .
But all these relativisations are so little in contradiction with the idea of
the constancy and unity of nature, that they rather are required and car-
ried out in the name of this very unity. The variation of space and time
measurements represents the necessary condition, through which the new
invariants of the theory are first found and established.100
The foremost invariance is what we would typically call general covariance—which
Cassirer considers “the fundamental principle of general relativity”:101
Above all there is the general form itself of the laws of nature, in which we
must henceforth recognise the true invariant and as such the true logical
basis of nature.102
Again, Cassirer sees Einstein’s theory as a fundamental step in the transition between
a common sense world made of (apparently invariant) ‘things,’ to a more abstract and
theoretical world of generally invariant mathematical objects, laws and relations.103
Only relations that hold for all observers are genuinely objective,104 they alone can be
objectively real “natural laws.”
We should only apply the term “natural laws,” and attribute objective re-
ality, to relationships whose form does not depend on the peculiarity of
our empirical measurement, on the special choice of the four variables
x1, x2, x3, x4 which express the space and time parameters.105
Cassirer even associates truth with general covariance:
99Ibid. p. 28: “Um diese Einheit, die durch den Widerstreit des Prinzips der Konstanz der Licht-
geschwindigkeit und des Relativita¨tsprinzips der Mechanik gefa¨hrdet schien, aufrecht zu erhalten und um sie
tiefer und fester zu begru¨nden, hat die Relativita¨tstheorie auf die Einerleiheit der Maßwerte fu¨r die Raum-
und Zeitgro¨ßen in den verschiedenen Systemen verzichtet.”
100Ibid. p. 29: “Aber alle diese Relativierungen stehen so wenig im Widerspruch zum Gedanken der Kon-
stanz und der Einheit der Natur, daß sie vielmehr im Namen eben dieser Einheit gefordert und durchgefu¨hrt
werden. Die Variation der Raum- und Zeitmaße bildet die notwendige B e d i n g u n g, vermo¨ge deren die
neuen Invarianten der Theorie sich erst finden und begru¨nden lassen.”
101Ibid. p. 39: “den Grundsatz der allgemeinen Relativita¨tstheorie, daß die allgemeinen Naturgesetze bei
ganz beliebigen Transformationen der Raum-Zeit-Variablen ihre Form nicht a¨ndern [ . . . ].”
102Ibid. p. 29: “Vor allem aber ist es die allgemeine F o r m der Naturgesetze selbst, in der wir nunmehr
das eigentlich Invariante und somit das eigentliche logische Grundgeru¨st der Natur u¨berhaupt zu erkennen
haben.”
103ibid. pp. 34-5
104Ibid. p. 35: “Wahrhaft objektiv ko¨nnen nur diejenigen Beziehungen und diejenigen besonderen Gro¨ßen-
werte heißen, die dieser kritischen Pru¨fung standhalten – d. h. die sich nicht nur fu¨r e i n System, sondern
fu¨r alle Systeme bewa¨hren.”
105Ibid. p. 39: “Wir du¨rfen eben nur diejenigen Beziehungen Naturgesetze n e n n e n, d. h. ihnen ob-
jektive Allgemeinheit zusprechen, deren Gestalt von der Besonderheit unserer empirischen Messung, von
der speziellen Wahl der vier Vera¨nderlichen x1 x2 x3 x4, die den Raum- und Zeitparameter ausdru¨cken,
unabha¨ngig ist.”
30
The space and time measurements in each individual system remain rela-
tive: but the truth and generality of physical knowledge, which is nonethe-
less attainable, lies in the reciprocal correspondence of all these measure-
ments, which transform according to specific rules.106
Truth is not captured by a single perspective:
For relativity theory does not teach that whatever appears is real, but on the
contrary warns against taking appearances which only hold with respect to
a single system as scientific truth, in other words as an expression of the
comprehensive and final legality of experience.107
Nor is it fully captured by an incomplete collection of perspectives; nothing short of
all of them will give the whole truth:
This will not be reached and ensured through observations and measure-
ments with respect to a single system, nor even with respect to arbitrarily
many systems, but only through the reciprocal correspondences between
results obtained in all possible systems.108
The point being that anything less than general covariance isn’t good enough: Uµν , t
µ
ν
and Γµνκ are ‘linearly’ covariant, in the sense that they behave like tensors with respect
to GL(4,R); but
Measurement in one system, or even in an unlimited plurality of ‘priv-
ileged’ systems of some sort, would yield only peculiarities in the end,
rather than the real ‘synthetic unity’ of the object.109
And “overcoming the anthropomorphism of the natural sensory world view is,” for
Cassirer, “the true task of physical knowledge,” whose accomplishment is advanced
by general covariance.110 Earman (2006, pp. 457-8) is “leery of an attempt to use an
appeal to intuitions about what is physically meaningful to establish, independently of
the details of particular theories, a general thesis about what can count as a general
physical quantity”; we have seen that Cassirer was less leery, and so—as Earman is
suggesting—was Einstein . . .
106Ibid. p. 36: “Die Raum- und Zeitmaße in jedem einzelnen System bleiben relativ: aber die Wahrheit und
Allgemeinheit, die der physikalischen Erkenntnis nichtsdestoweniger erreichbar ist, besteht darin, daß alle
diese Maße sich wechselseitig entsprechen und einander nach bestimmten Regeln zugeordnet sind.”
107Ibid. p. 50: “Denn nicht, das jedem wahr sei, was ihm erscheint, will die [ . . . ] Relativita¨tstheorie
lehren, sondern umgekehrt warnt sie davon, Erscheinungen, die nur von einem einzelnen bestimmten System
aus gelten, schon fu¨r Wahrheit im Sinne der Wissenschaft, d. h. fu¨r einen Ausdruck der umfassenden und
endgu¨ltigen Gesetzlichkeit der Erfahrung zu nehmen.”
108Ibid. p. 50: “Dieser wird weder durch die Beobachtungen und Messungen eines Einzelsystems, noch
selbst durch diejenigen beliebig vieler solcher Systeme, sondern nur durch die wechselseitige Zuordnung der
Ergebnisse a l l e r mo¨glichen Systeme erreicht und gewa¨hrleistet.”
109Ibid. p. 37: “Die Messung in e i n e m System, oder selbst in einer unbeschra¨nkten Vielheit irgendwel-
cher ”berechtigter“ Systeme, wu¨rde schließlich immer nur Einzelheiten, nicht aber die echte ”synthetische
Einheit“ des Gegenstandes ergeben.”
110Ibid. p. 37: “Der Anthropomorphismus des natu¨rlichen sinnlichen Weltbildes, dessen U¨berwindung
die eigentliche Aufgabe der physikalischen Erkenntnis ist, wird hier abermals um einen Schritt weiter
zuru¨ckgedra¨ngt.”
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3.13 Consistency
One hesitates—with or without Cassirer—to attach objective reality or even importance
to things overly shaped by the peculiarities, point of view, state of motion or tastes of
the subject or observer. Allowing him no participation would be somewhat drastic,
leaving at most the meagrest ‘truly objective’ residue; but too much could make the
object rather ‘unobjective,’ and belong more to the observer than to the common reality.
Appropriate transformation properties allow a moderate and regulated participation.
Is there an easy way of characterising how much participation would be too much?
Of determining the ‘appropriateness’ of transformation properties? Again: vanish-
ing, annihilation seems an important criterion, as to which the relationist can demand
agreement for physical significance; he will deny the reality of a quantity that can be
transformed away, that disappears for some observers but not others.
But perhaps there is more at issue than just opinion or perspective. Much as one can
wonder whether the different witnesses in Rashomon are lying, rather than expressing
reasonable differences in perspective; whether their versions are incompatible, not just
coloured by stance and prejudice—here the relationist may even complain about some-
thing as strong as inconsistency, while his opponent sees no more than rival points of
view.
Of an object that’s at rest in one system but not in another111 one can say that it’s
moving & isn’t, which sounds contradictory. Consistency can of course be restored with
longer statements specifying perspective, but the tension between the short statements
is not without significance—if the number were a scalar even they would agree. Similar
considerations apply, mutatis mutandis, to covariance; one would then speak of form
or syntax being the same, rather than of numerical equality.
Consistency and reality are not unrelated. Consistency is certainly bound up with
mathematical existence, for which it has long been considered necessary—perhaps
even sufficient.112 And in mathematical physics, how can the physical significance
of a mathematical structure not be compromised by its inconsistency? If inconsistency
prevents part of a formalism from ‘existing,’ how can it represent reality? The re-
lationist will argue that an object, like tµν , whose existence is complicated—perhaps
even compromised—by an ‘inconsistency’ of sorts (it’s there, and it isn’t), cannot be
physically meaningful.
111Observer Ξ with four-velocity V attributes speed w =
√|g(w,w)| to body β with four-velocity W ,
where the (spacelike) three-velocity w is the projection
PV⊥W =
3∑
i=1
〈dxi,W 〉∂i = W − g(V,W )V
onto the three-dimensional simultaneity subspace V⊥ = span{∂1, ∂2, ∂3} orthogonal to V ; and the projec-
tor PV⊥ = 〈dxi, · 〉∂i is the identity minus the projector PV = g(V, · )V onto the ray determined by V .
Another observer Ξ ′ moving at V ′ sees speed w′ =
√|g(w′,w′)| = ‖PV ′⊥W‖ (all of this around the
same event). Here we’re supposing that one of the speeds vanishes.
112See Poincare´ (1902, p. 59).
32
3.14 The generation of gravitational waves
LEX I. [ . . . ] Majora autem planetarum et cometarum corpora motus suos et pro-
gressivos et circulares in spatiis minus resistentibus factos conservant diutius.
We can now turn from the reality of gravitational waves to their very generation, about
which the relationist can also wonder.
Belief in gravitational radiation rests largely on the binary star PSR 1913 +16,
which loses kinetic energy as it spirals inwards (with respect to popular coordinates
at any rate). If the kinetic energy is not to disappear without trace, it has to be con-
verted, presumably into radiation. Since its disappearance is only ruled out by the
conservation law, however, the very generation of gravitational waves must be subject
to the perplexities surrounding conservation.113 If the conservation law is suspicious
enough to make us wonder whether the lost energy is really radiated into the gravi-
tational field, why take the polarisation of that radiation—which stands in the way of
the full determination of inertia—seriously? As we were wondering in §3.7, couldn’t
it be no more than a purely decorative freedom, without reality or physical meaning?
The binary star’s behaviour and emission of gravitational waves can admittedly be cal-
culated with great accuracy, but the calculations are not generally covariant and only
work in certain coordinate systems.
Even the ‘spiral’ behaviour, associated so intimately with the loss of kinetic energy,
is wegtransformierbar. At every point along the worldlines σ1 and σ2 of the pulsars
one can always choose (cf. Joshua x, 13: “the sun stood still, and the moon stayed”)
a basis erµ whose timelike vector e
r
0 coincides with the four-velocity σ˙
r (r = 1, 2).
Since nothing prevents the bases from being holonomic we can view them as natural
bases erµ = ∂
r
µ of a coordinate system, with respect to which σ˙
r will have components
(1, 0, 0, 0)—the three naughts being the components of the vanishing three-velocity v.
The coordinate system can be chosen so as to leave the pulsars at, say, the constant
positions (t, 1, 0, 0) and (t, 0, 0, 0). If the pulsars don’t move, if they have no ‘kinesis,’
how can they lose a kinetic energy (which is after all a quadratic function of the three-
velocity v) they never had in the first place?114
It may be felt that the pulsars have a genuine angular momentum, with the right
transformation properties; that they really are going around. But angular momentum
is about as coordinate-dependent as quantities get—its transformation properties could
hardly be worse. The range of substitutions on which general relativity was built allows
us to choose a coordinate system that eliminates the rotation by turning with the pul-
sars. If one feels instinctively that the rotation is real and legitimate, that it transcends
coordinates, one’s instincts are surreptitiously appealing—comparing the motion—to
a background that general relativity was conceived to do away with (but since seems
to have found its way back). We are not really saying that such a backdrop is necessar-
ily wrong or absent or unphysical or absurd, only that it should not be appealed to in
general relativity, which was invented to get rid of it; the point we are making is more
113Cf. Hoefer (2000), Baker (2005).
114The pulsars are a bit large for low-dimensional idealisation (see §3.4); but one can still transform away
the motions of representative worldlines—perhaps described by the centres of gravity—selected from their
worldtubes. Cf. Weyl (1924, p. 198).
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theoretical, conceptual and mathematical than physical. Certain coordinate systems
may seem artificial, pathological, even perverse; but general relativity is precisely the
theory of such perversions, or rather of a generality encompassing so much that many
surprising substitutions are admitted along with more mundane ones. Some transfor-
mations may savour of dishonest trickery; it might seem we are unscrupulously taking
advantage of the full range of possibilities offered by general relativity, of substitu-
tions lying on the fringe of legitimacy, out on the dark edges of a class too enormous
to take seriously in its entirety. We can only repeat that the point of general relativ-
ity is precisely its full generality. Abstract talk of diffeomorphisms may make certain
radical transformations less alarming—for are some diffeomorphisms more legitimate
than others? Isn’t general relativity the egalitarian theory putting them all on an equal
footing?
Suppose we try to resolve the inward spiral into a rotation and a simple ‘inward,’
‘centripetal’ motion. What about the centripetal motion? All that’s needed for its elimi-
nation is a continuous recalibration of coordinates (leaving their directions unaffected),
a time-dependent version of the transformation going from, say, inches to metres. In the
next section we will appeal to geodesic deviation to express the relationship between
neighbouring worldlines; but the pulsars are much too far apart for the construction of
a well-behaved, tensorial acceleration of one pulsar with respect to the other.115
To question the reality or generation of gravitational waves, the relationist would
demand general covariance—one of the central principles of general relativity—as a
matter of principle, whereas his opponent will fall back on the more tolerant day-
to-day pragmatism of the practising, calculating, approximating physicist, who views
the theory more as an instrumental collection of recipes, perturbation methods, tricks
and expedients, by which even the most sacred principles can be circumvented, than
as a handful of fundamental and inviolable axioms from which all is to be deduced.
General covariance may have been indispensable at first (it seems a whole crowd of
midwives was assembled for so demanding a birth), but surely general relativity has
now outgrown it . . .
3.15 A Doppler effect
The absolutist will be doubly satisfied by the discovery of gravitational waves, which
would not only reinforce his belief in the underdetermination of inertia, but even allow
absolute motion, as we shall now see.
We began with Newton’s efforts to sort out absolute and relative motus, first took
(certain occurrences of) motus to mean acceleration, and accordingly considered ab-
solute acceleration; but are now in a position to countenance absolute motion more
literally. The four ontic-tidal-gravitational observables of Lusanna & Pauri may even
give us absolute position: an observer capable of measuring them would infer his ab-
solute position from the ontic-tidal-gravitational peculiarities of the spot—and even an
equally absolute motion from the variation of those peculiarities. But their measure-
ment is anything but trivial, as one gathers from §2.2 of Lusanna & Pauri (2006b).
The importance of metrology for their programme is clear: if the four ontic-tidal-
115Affine structure allows the (unambiguous) comparison of neighbouring, not distant, directions.
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gravitational observables are in fact unobservable, why bother with them? We avoid all
the formidable intricacies of metrology, faced with such competence and courage by
Lusanna & Pauri, by proposing a Gedankenexperiment that’s as simple as it is impos-
sible: Let’s say that relative motion is motion referred to something—where by ‘thing’
we mean a material object that has mass whatever the state of motion of the observer
(materiality, again, is not an opinion). Otherwise motion will be absolute. Suppose
an empty flat universe is perturbed by (3). Changes in the frequency ω measured by
a roving observer would indicate absolute motion, and allow a reconstruction, through
ω = kaV
a, of the observer’s absolute velocity V a.
Is this undulating space-time absolute, substantival,116 Newtonian? It is absolute
to the extent that according to the criterion adopted it admits absolute motion. But
its absoluteness precludes its substantival reification, which would make the motion
relative to something and hence not absolute. Newton, though no doubt approving on
the whole, would disown it, for “Spatium absolutum [ . . . ] semper manet similare et
immobile,” and our undulating space-time is neither ‘similar to itself’ (Rabcd oscillates,
though Rbd vanishes identically) nor immobile.
We may remember that Newton spoke of revealing absolute motus through its
causes and effects, through forces. Absolute motion is precisely what our thought
experiment would reveal, and through forces, just as Newton wanted: the forces, for
instance, registered by a (most sensitive) dynamometer linking the masses whose vary-
ing tidal oscillations give rise to the described Doppler effect.
The absolutist will claim, then, that gravitational waves are so real they wiggle the
detector, and in so doing reveal absolute motion. But wiggling, the relationist will
object, is not generally covariant: it can be transformed away. Let us continue to sup-
pose, for simplicity, that the masses (two are enough) making up the detector are in
the middle of nowhere, and not on the surface of the earth—whose gravitational field
is not the point here. In what sense do they wiggle? As with the binary star, we can
find coordinate systems that leave them where they are, say at (t, 1, 0, 0) and (t, 0, 0, 0).
Both masses describe geodesics; how can things wiggle if they neither accelerate117
nor move? The absolutist will reply that each mass, despite moving inertially, accel-
erates absolutely with respect to the other, for the tensorial, generally covariant ex-
pression d2ξa/dτ2 = Ra0c0ξ
c representing geodesic deviation cannot be transformed
away (where ξa is the separation, with components ξµ = 〈dxµa , ξa〉, and τ is the proper
time of the mass to which the acceleration of the other is referred). This puts the re-
lationist in something of a corner, mathematically—from which he could only emerge
experimentally by pointing out that the acceleration in question, however tensorial and
covariant, has yet to be measured.
116Newton never seems to use words resembling ‘substance’ in reference to his absolute space, whereas
the literature about it is full of them.
117Cf. Lusanna (2007, p. 80): “all realistic observers are accelerated,” for unaccelerated observers would
have to be too small to be realistic; but see §3.4 above.
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4 Final remarks
The reader may feel, perhaps uneasily, that these explorations have been. . . exactly
that; that they lack the factious zeal that so often animates the literature, giving it
colour and heat and sentiment. But the enthusiast remains free to take sides, without
being discouraged by our hesitating ambivalence.
Having viewed general relativity as a reply to the absolute inertial structure of New-
tonian mechanics—which acts on matter despite being unobservable, and does not even
react to it—we have wondered about the extent to which the inertia of general relativity
is determined by matter and thus overcomes the absoluteness it was responding to.118
We have chosen to concentrate on punctual determination, paying little attention to
the holistic, field-theoretical constraint contributed by distant circumstances and stip-
ulations. And at a point the matter tensor T ab underdetermines inertia by ten degrees
freedom, eight of which can be eliminated by suitable gauge choices. The remaining
two represent the polarisation of gravitational waves, whose reality the relationist can
contest by insisting on general covariance; for the generation and energy-momentum
of gravitational waves can, in appropriate senses, be transformed away.119 Their (long
awaited) detection, which may at first seem just as wegtransformierbar, would in fact
be generally covariant.
So gravitational waves have an awkward status in general relativity: though not as
mathematically sturdy as one might want them to be, they aren’t so flimsy the relationist
can do away with them without qualms. If gravitational waves could be legitimately
dismissed as a fiction, the determination of inertia by matter would be rather complete;
and general relativity could be viewed as a satisfactory response to the absolute features
of Newtonian mechanics that bothered Einstein.
Belot & Earman (2001, p. 227) write that “It is no longer possible to cash out
the disagreement in terms of the nature of absolute motion (absolute acceleration will
be defined in terms of the four-dimensional geometrical structure that substantivalists
and relationalists agree about).” Relationists and absolutists—as we call them—may
well agree that absolute motion, or rather inertia, is represented by affine structure;
but disagree about the nature of its determination by matter: only a relationist would
contest the physical significance of the mathematical underdetermination at issue here.
Questioning the reality of gravitational waves is neither orthodox nor usual; but
their bad transformation behaviour, which does not seem entirely meaningless, is worth
dwelling on. While we await convincing, unambiguous experimental evidence, our be-
lief in gravitational waves will (or perhaps should) be bound up with our feelings about
general covariance, about general intersubjective agreement.
We thank Silvio Bergia, Roberto Danese, Dennis Dieks, Mauro Dorato, John Earman,
118Again, the very fact that matter constrains inertia at all makes their relationship more balanced than
before, as an anonymous referee has pointed out; but a full assessment of how good a response (to the
absolute features of Newtonian mechanics) general relativity proved should nonetheless consider the details
of the relationship.
119Again, only at a single point will Wegtransformierbarkeit be logically tidy, depending on the object (tµν
or Γµντ or whatever) alone; over broader regions much else would have to be considered as well; one would
be reduced to a long and complicated enumeration of cases: here it holds, there it doesn’t, there it might if
only etc.
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